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Username "bitmover" occurred in the following posts (quoted and/or mentioned):


1. Post 67094696 (unedited backup) (by Pmalek) (scraped on Sun Aug 30 09:08:38 CEST 2026) in [ANN] bitcoindata.science:

Quote from: LoyceV on August 29, 2026, 07:41:16 AM
Don't blame bitmover, it's my server that's "missing". It makes me think of the scene in Silicon Valley where they threw all their servers at the back of a rental van.

Update: it's back online Smiley
The only logical explanation is that they are following this thread, they saw my post, they put all their manpower on the task of bringing your server back online, and now everything is back to normal. Cheesy

Quote from: LoyceV on August 29, 2026, 02:25:29 PM
Let's test this with Pmalek's list:
...
Don't beat yourself up, creating 95 dynamic images instantly is a lot to ask.
Yeah, most of the images don't load. But the way it is now it's already working so that is great.
@bitmover I wouldn't lose any sleep over it.



2. Post 67094489 (unedited backup) (by MusaMohamed) (scraped on Sun Aug 30 06:00:20 CEST 2026) in What is the biggest mistake new Bitcoin users make?:

Quote from: LUCKMCFLY on Today at 01:42:14 AM
The lack of financial education is evident when people don't have the fundamentals of investing, the Dollar-Cost Averaging (DCA) method, basic concepts like accumulation, and different ways to manage their money, including creating a separate emergency fund and not touching their Bitcoin investment.
It was harder to access educational resources in the past but the development, application and massive adoption of Internet have changed many things including educational resources and learning for many people. Nowadays, in modern world, it's considerably more easy to find and access free and open-access educational resources. With connection to Internet, people who want to learn now can learn about many things freely without extra expensive cost paid to schools or courses.

They can easily search about Dollar Cost Averaging and learn about this strategy for long term accumulation and investment.
https://costavg.com/
https://bitcoindata.science/withdrawal-strategy



3. Post 67093280 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 19:32:55 CEST 2026) in [ANN] bitcoindata.science:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 04:38:39 PM
I will use your post to test and see if i can still improve performance with small changes
I guess your webserver gives the "it doesn't exist" result when the image isn't generated fast enough. If you can somehow make the client wait a few seconds until it's done, it may work. But don't ask me how to implement this Wink



4. Post 67092900 (unedited backup) (by Paredao) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 17:01:19 CEST 2026) in NovaDAX anuncia fim das operações (saquem suas moedas):

Quote from: bitmover on August 27, 2026, 01:00:52 PM

Esqueceu a walltime.
Adorava ela, usei muito.
So tinha bitcoin, era ótima.  Barata e honesta e de qualidade.

Uma boa exchange. Lembro que ela era basicona. Até o visual do site era bem básico. Parecia feita no quarto de algum nerd de condomínio fechado.
Assim que vieram as primeiras regulamentações, eles trataram de fechar e sumir do mapa.



5. Post 67092873 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 16:56:31 CEST 2026) in Complete overview of users on DT1 and DT2 and their ratings:

Update:
DT 1
     1. 35: theymos (Trust: +31 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (58) 15033 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     2. 11425: gmaxwell (Trust: +12 / =0 / -1) (DT1! (16) 10465 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     3. 33156: vapourminer (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (7) 5722 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     4. 55384: Foxpup (Trust: +6 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (14) 2810 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     5. 64507: philipma1957 (Trust: +34 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (21) 11368 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     6. 65636: babo (Trust: +15 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (4) 4790 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     7. 78147: Cyrus (Trust: +21 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (21) 2887 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     8. 84866: ibminer (Trust: +14 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (8) 2791 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     9. 85033: d5000 (Trust:  neutral) (DT1! (4) 10060 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    10. 97582: joker_josue (Trust: +8 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (7) 6900 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    11. 112493: Pmalek (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 8965 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    12. 113670: Mitchell (Trust: +46 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (22) 2238 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    13. 123824: albon (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (11) 2182 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    14. 131333: wwzsocki (Trust: +14 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (0) 1526 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    15. 137185: jeremypwr (Trust: +58 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (13) 6277 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    16. 140582: gbianchi (Trust: +4 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 2619 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    17. 140584: EFS (Trust: +12 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (8) 2184 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    18. 158444: hybridsole (Trust: +20 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (7) 513 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    19. 164749: stompix (Trust:  neutral) (DT1! (11) 6804 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    20. 164822: hilariousandco (Trust: +27 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (30) 1951 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    21. 189967: buckrogers (Trust: +30 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (5) 196 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    22. 204821: Buchi-88 (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 2389 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    23. 206143: Lesbian Cow (Trust: +45 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (10) 758 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    24. 252510: JayJuanGee (Trust: +6 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (22) 13885 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    25. 257071: NeuroticFish (Trust: +3 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (10) 6272 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    26. 290195: achow101 (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (12) 6794 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    27. 300014: DaveF (Trust: +34 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (18) 6958 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    28. 314792: examplens (Trust: +10 / =5 / -0) (DT1! (24) 3909 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    29. 317618: nutildah (Trust: +20 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (33) 10711 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    30. 350580: irfan_pak10 (Trust: +13 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (2) 747 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    31. 355846: yahoo62278 (Trust: +40 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (23) 4481 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    32. 364070: bitbollo (Trust: +18 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (7) 3988 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    33. 369212: zazarb (Trust: +28 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 548 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    34. 379147: pooya87 (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 11472 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    35. 379487: LFC_Bitcoin (Trust: +32 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (22) 12149 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    36. 395806: o_solo_miner (Trust: +8 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 540 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    37. 405464: mocacinno (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 4541 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    38. 405482: Real-Duke (Trust: +3 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (2) 2934 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    39. 407174: klarki (Trust: +7 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (4) 4707 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    40. 459836: LoyceV (Trust: +33 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (62) 21505 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    41. 521899: SFR10 (Trust: +16 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (5) 3153 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    42. 533583: Lucius (Trust:  neutral) (DT1! (2) 6727 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    43. 805820: Lafu (Trust: +18 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (14) 4122 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    44. 830967: tweetious (Trust: +33 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 459 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    45. 839568: AakZaki (Trust: +8 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (7) 2234 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    46. 889300: giammangiato (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 1501 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    47. 901859: buwaytress (Trust: +29 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (11) 3952 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    48. 914465: crwth (Trust: +3 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (0) 1361 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    49. 932931: Ale88 (Trust: +4 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 3708 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    50. 949248: Kryptowerk (Trust: +49 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 1325 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    51. 995810: hosemary (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (9) 6966 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    52. 1000199: krogothmanhattan (Trust: +96 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (17) 4236 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    53. 1016855: JollyGood (Trust: +20 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (20) 2033 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    54. 1045971: igebotz (Trust: +13 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (11) 2337 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    55. 1051955: roycilik (Trust: +11 / =0 / -1) (DT1! (1) 1908 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    56. 1052091: CryptopreneurBrainboss (Trust: +17 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (15) 5150 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    57. 1059082: hugeblack (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (11) 4654 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    58. 1067333: El duderino_ (Trust: +27 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (11) 15655 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    59. 1097370: KTChampions (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (6) 2359 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    60. 1099980: Trofo (Trust: +34 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (14) 3695 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    61. 1137579: icopress (Trust: +90 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (39) 13344 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    62. 1190631: JeromeTash (Trust: +3 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (7) 1487 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    63. 1247226: logfiles (Trust: +6 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (12) 2387 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    64. 1269497: Bitcoin_Arena (Trust: +2 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (6) 2110 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    65. 1285797: GazetaBitcoin (Trust: +13 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (17) 10140 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    66. 1311641: tvplus006 (Trust: +13 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (15) 2659 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    67. 1424178: mole0815 (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (9) 3684 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    68. 1554927: bitmover (Trust: +7 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (6) 7684 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    69. 1582324: DdmrDdmr (Trust: +10 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (20) 11378 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    70. 1827294: Husna QA (Trust: +3 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (5) 3516 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    71. 1836948: Bthd (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 2626 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    72. 1852120: fillippone (Trust: +12 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (20) 21334 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    73. 1862043: cryptofrka (Trust: +20 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (8) 3077 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    74. 1878246: abhiseshakana (Trust: +2 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (2) 2616 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    75. 1980983: The Cryptovator (Trust: +20 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (22) 2610 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    76. 1982152: lovesmayfamilis (Trust: +28 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (31) 5826 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    77. 2003859: DireWolfM14 (Trust: +19 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (17) 5802 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    78. 2015418: notblox1 (Trust: +3 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 1611 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    79. 2344286: Little Mouse (Trust: +52 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (8) 3795 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    80. 2363935: YOSHIE (Trust: +10 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (20) 1910 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    81. 2477002: inspace (Trust: +5 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (4) 1652 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    82. 2497429: jokers10 (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (6) 4179 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    83. 2519096: Awaklara (Trust: +2 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (8) 859 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    84. 2652924: geophphreigh (Trust: +33 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (6) 1146 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    85. 2654005: zasad@ (Trust: +3 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (7) 5753 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    86. 2658890: Rikafip (Trust: +16 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (28) 8251 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    87. 2709122: Etranger (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (2) 1887 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    88. 2739424: NotATether (Trust: +8 / =2 / -0) (DT1! (9) 10166 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    89. 2739454: Stalker22 (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (9) 1647 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    90. 2745549: decodx (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (8) 978 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    91. 2775483: BlackHatCoiner (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (6) 10049 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    92. 2776678: Charles-Tim (Trust: +6 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (7) 6503 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    93. 2796662: Lillominato89 (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (4) 1291 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    94. 2836461: Free Market Capitalist (Trust: +1 / =1 / -0) (DT1! (11) 3619 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    95. 3442614: YodasRedRocket (Trust: +31 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (2) 651 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
    96. 3519432: SirJohnVonSlotty (Trust: +14 / =0 / -0) (DT1! (3) 1022 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)

DT 2
     1. 3: satoshi (Trust: +44 / =0 / -0) (8880 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     2. 4: sirius (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (935 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     3. 1268: nanotube (Trust: +2 / =0 / -0) (1 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     4. 2252: laanwj (Trust:  neutral) (50 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     5. 2676: casascius (Trust: +6 / =0 / -1) (193 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     6. 2759: midnightmagic (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (27 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)
     7. 2786: Pieter Wuille (Trust: +1 / =0 / -0) (203 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     8. 3380: Vladimir (Trust:  neutral) (1 Merit earned) (Trust list) (BPIP)
     9. 3420: dooglus (Trust: +10 / =0 / -0) (335 Merit earned) (Custom Trust list) (BPIP)



6. Post 67092766 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 16:25:31 CEST 2026) in [ANN] bitcoindata.science:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 10:15:35 AM
I think now my server would be able to handle all calls from your table  simultaneously.
Let's test this with Pmalek's list:

































































































7. Post 67091866 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 09:41:19 CEST 2026) in [ANN] bitcoindata.science:

Quote from: Pmalek on Today at 07:09:07 AM
Any idea what could have happened? Did something maybe change on your end recently?
Don't blame bitmover, it's my server that's "missing". It makes me think of the scene in Silicon Valley where they threw all their servers at the back of a rental van.



8. Post 67091820 (unedited backup) (by Pmalek) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 09:09:13 CEST 2026) in [ANN] bitcoindata.science:

Hi bitmover,

All the images in my Withdrawal Fees and Withdrawal Amounts on Crypto Casinos thread are down at the moment. I noticed it late last night. Any idea what could have happened? Did something maybe change on your end recently? I will tag @LoyceV as well since I am also getting data from his for that table of mine.



9. Post 67091304 (unedited backup) (by suzanne5223) (scraped on Sat Aug 29 01:26:49 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 27, 2026, 08:54:36 AM

The "hacker" should have used ThorChain, and swapped the stolen Bitcoin to Monero starting in Day Zero and continued that when more Bitcoin is stolen.

But the hacker's current move is good to test how those mixers are good in obfuscation. For that purpose, they should probably test CoinJoin too.

Thorchain website isn't working right now, and no monero support


I am not sure how you can access it without the front end , but it should be possible. Actually, using the front end would be quite dangerous for him because it could save logs.
Please don't let us talk about the information that may help the hacker to successfully mix the stolen Bitcoin due to this forum's powerful backlinks, because the hacker is technically looking for means to do it, which is why the 65BTC was used as a test. Besides, the hackers are still stealing from people who are still using the vulnerable coldcard wallet.
https://x.com/intangiblecoins/status/2093457952103387618
https://cktripwire.com/



10. Post 67090803 (unedited backup) (by Dark.Look) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 22:39:19 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 05:36:09 PM
This is where things get complicated,  and may become insecure specially in long term

The problem is it's not the signing setup but it's the fact that you never agreed to the device.

Whatever you build. build a second independent implementation of anything that comes from those same words to get the xpub from.Before funding anything get the xpub from those same words on a second indepndent implementation of anything you build. Same words and same xpub. I think both sparrow and electrum will do it from seed without the internet access. If both are the same then the device has not silently replaced or corrupted the text you entered. Otherwis you know that at the time the wallet was empty.

The whole thing this mess argues for is that one cannot estimate entropy from the output and vice versa a device to which one gave good entropy. The only element in the chain that can be verified is cross derivation.



11. Post 67090628 (unedited backup) (by Mia Chloe) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 21:50:01 CEST 2026) in Is there really need to know operate the linux OS for learning blockchain dev?:

Quote from: Zerotrace on August 25, 2026, 06:18:31 AM
~snip
The point is there are many advantages to making use of linux especially in the case of bitcoin you have added perks like understanding how important open source codes actually are plus you have a full view of everything happening on your system unlike windows. The only difference is Linux is slightly harder because of it's structure but it's worth it.

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 11:54:12 PM
I think it is very hard to become a developer in anything without having at least some Linux experience.
I think this is even the most important part of using Linux aside from its open source features. You'll be more accustomed to command line codes. Tails is also a good one but less popular.



12. Post 67090362 (unedited backup) (by joker_josue) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 20:34:13 CEST 2026) in Analise BTC onchain:

Eu estou como o Bitmover, essas dados geográficos são sempre muito subjetivos.

Quando ao numero de transações se ter mantido, acho que é sinal na confiança que existe no Bitcoin de modo geral. Um caso com o Coldcard, num outro tipo de mercado/ativo, provavelmente teriam um impacto bem mais significativo.

De resto, os números mostram que o mercado está mais ou menos estável, o que é algo positivo. Começando a dar sinais de animo. Veremos.



13. Post 67090225 (unedited backup) (by Meuserna) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 19:53:08 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 05:36:09 PM
There are many ways to generate your own random seed. Dice is one, but I prefer the "Entropia" method. BTC Hardware Solutions sells what they call "Entropia" tablets, which are plastic seed words. Dump 'em in a mixing bowl, stir it up and pick a word. Write it down. Put the word back in the bowl, stir again and pick again. Do this 23 times and use those words as your seed, letting a hardware wallet generate the 24th word (the checksum).

Don't want to spend the money on buying Entropia? No problem. Print the seed words on paper and chop 'em up. The best way to do this is list the words in columns. You should easily be able to get all of the words in 4 or 5 sheets of paper. Chop 'em up so each word is on a slip of paper. Dump 'em in a bowl. And by the way... any inconsistencies in how you chop them up will add more randomness.

I dont think generating your own seed is a problem.
But what do you do with it after you generated it? Do you add your seed to a hw?
Do you add to a electrum in an offline device and generate qr codes of signed transactions  to scan in other devices

This is where things get complicated,  and may become insecure specially in long term

I enter my seed phrase into a hardware wallet that is:

100% open source.
Airgapped.
Stateless.

Airgapped means the device never connects to the internet, or to anything at all. The device communicates using a camera and a screen. Hackers can't reach it over the internet.

Stateless means my seed is never saved on the device. When the device turns off, the seed and the wallet are wiped. If the device gets lost or stolen, no worries. There's nothing on it.

I never save my seed on any device, ever.

To use an airgapped and stateless device, you need a coordinator app, just as you use with any hardware wallet. I'm a fan of Sparrow for desktop, and Blue Wallet for mobile. Nunchuk is great too, for managing xpubs, but it's not as user friendly.



14. Post 67090125 (unedited backup) (by Meuserna) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 19:31:25 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 12:18:50 PM
And I firmly believe Ledger's key extraction scheme is a disaster waiting to happen.
For now, the extraction must be physically authorized in the device.
Is that a hardware limitation, or is it just the firmware telling you you need to authorize it? I'm pretty sure a cracked firmware wouldn't need your consent, and thousands of hackers can peacefully try to hack the device from their own home.

This is how it was designed. Without your PIN, the seed doesn't leave the device.

Quote
Plus, your Ledger will only allow your seed phrase to leave the wallet as encrypted fragments when you permit it. Setting up Ledger Recover requires you to enter the device PIN and consent to start the process on the device. Without your permission, the device will not (and cannot) fragment or send the encrypted fragments anywhere. That means if someone wants to exploit Ledger Recover to steal your seed phrase, they would need to have your PIN in the first place, which would already give them access to your wallet.
https://www.ledger.com/academy/what-is-ledger-recover

Surely you realize quoting Ledger about their closed source code is the same as quoting Coinkite about ColdCard's closed source code. In May, they said it was the best. How'd that work out?

I do not understand why people trust code that isn't open source. It makes no sense.

In theory, you know how Ledger's code is supposed to function, according to Ledger. But hackers aren't going to use the code as intended. They're going to find exploits. And since Ledger devices have the ability to export the seed out of the device over the internet (which for years they swore wasn't even possible!), their code is one heck of a honeypot just waiting to be hacked.

And I do not understand why people trust companies after they lied. Ledger said this:

Quote
"Private data, such as your private keys will be protected and never leave the device due to the combination of BOLOS and the Secure Element."

That was a lie. It's one of many lies they had to scrub from their website because their firmware contains an API to extract keys from their devices over the internet, which for years they swore was not possible.

Here's a lie that cracks me up.

Quote
"WE ARE OPEN SOURCE"

That's printed on the box of a closed-source Ledger hardware wallet:
https://i.redd.it/dysdk6j9516b1.jpg

And here's a great quote from BTChip, Ledger owner & co-founder

Quote
There's no backdoor and I obviously can't prove it

He obviously can't prove it, because his code isn't open.

Trusting Ledger's word today is like Trusting Coinkite's word in May.



15. Post 67090051 (unedited backup) (by Meuserna) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 19:09:37 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:02:05 AM

And I firmly believe Ledger's key extraction scheme is a disaster waiting to happen. It'll go down the same way, except in Ledger's case, it'll be the devices themselves that get accessed. And when it happens, finally, people will realize it's stooooopid to think you can safely secure Bitcoin on a hardware wallet that can be accessed over the internet.

For now, the extraction must be physically authorized in the device. People who authorized are at risk, not sure about the others.

Prove it.

You can't, because the firmware isn't open source. I'm sure somebody wants to say, "Well, some of it is." And some of this meal isn't poison. Want a bite?

I do not understand why people trust closed source firmware.

Which hardware wallet do you recommend , if any? Trezor looks to work in a poor RNG

I don't know where you're getting that from. Trezor's entropy looks to be strong - however - why let a device generate a seed for you in the first place? I've been generating my own seed phrases for years. I know the randomness of my seeds is truly random because I did it myself.

There are many ways to generate your own random seed. Dice is one, but I prefer the "Entropia" method. BTC Hardware Solutions sells what they call "Entropia" tablets, which are plastic seed words. Dump 'em in a mixing bowl, stir it up and pick a word. Write it down. Put the word back in the bowl, stir again and pick again. Do this 23 times and use those words as your seed, letting a hardware wallet generate the 24th word (the checksum).

Don't want to spend the money on buying Entropia? No problem. Print the seed words on paper and chop 'em up. The best way to do this is list the words in columns. You should easily be able to get all of the words in 4 or 5 sheets of paper. Chop 'em up so each word is on a slip of paper. Dump 'em in a bowl. And by the way... any inconsistencies in how you chop them up will add more randomness.



16. Post 67089788 (unedited backup) (by Pmalek) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 17:37:07 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitbollo on Today at 09:43:48 AM
-extra-word or bip39 (that is not a password but literally part of the seed) yes it's an extra word and not the password it would be used.
Yes a very long string could help but at this point I don't see any reason to have those risks and rely on a third party for a seed generation.
My point was that passphrases do work as an additional security layer. How well they work depends on their length and complexity. I am in no way advocating for people to stay with Coldcard and keep using them. I think and hope that the company is done and that we won't see them come back from this. I am advocating for using complex passphrases as seed extensions, though. A good passphrase could have saved some of those people who lost their coins, giving them some time to find and set up a different storage for their coins when the hacking began.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 12:18:50 PM
This. But I agree that it looks to have "enough" entropy, specially with a strong passphrase. But not as good as ledged for example.
A 12-word seed generates 128 bits of entropy. A 24-word seed generates 256 bits. 128 bits of entropy is enough. If you make your Trezor generate a 24-word seed, just like Ledger does, you would get the same 256 bits.



17. Post 67089719 (unedited backup) (by DEX.fo_off) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 17:11:25 CEST 2026) in DEX.fo — Automatic Crypto Exchange | No KYC/AML | BTC ETH XMR LTC DAI USDT | :

Quote from: examplens
Unfortunately, this may get you banned from Bitcointalk. Mixers are not allowed to promote themselves on Bitcointalk, not even indirect promotion, if the service offers another service in addition to mixing.

Quote from: stompix
Well, as the examplens said, the moment you implement that, Theymos is going to ban you and delete all the topics here.
Plus, just from the pure business side, I don't see why you would try to expand that way, especially with USDT, which is somewhat of a hot coin now eyed by all the sactions, it's just adding a lot of trouble to be honest.

Quote from: bitmover
I think it is safer to remain as an exchange to avoid scrutiny from the authorities as well.
You can offer a great private gain from swapping coins already.
Forcing the user to make usdt > btc and then btc > usdt back already increases his privacy and makes your service stay as an exchange

Quote from: examplens
The option was announced by the DEX strain as a conversion, and perhaps the closest would be, for example, a conversion from ERC20 to TRC20 or vice versa. Where it would be presented as the focus of switching the network on which the coins are. In a way, it wouldn't be direct mixing feature

Appreciate all three of you catching this — genuinely useful pushback. The intent was never to add a mixing feature; the idea was to let users avoid the extra network fee/spread from routing USDT through BTC and back when all they actually need is the same asset on a different chain. That's a network-switch use case, not a mixing one — but we can see how the wording read otherwise.

To be clear: there's no mixer coming. We'll stick to what examplens suggested — framing this properly as USDT network conversion (ERC-20 ↔ TRC-20), not same-network round-tripping. Thanks for keeping us out of trouble on this one.




18. Post 67089590 (unedited backup) (by rdluffy) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 16:28:25 CEST 2026) in [GUIA PRÁTICO] DeCripto 2026 – A armadilha do limite de R$ 35 mil:

Quote from: TryNinja on Today at 01:42:27 PM
Amigo, esse seu post me soou muito como IA. Rodei uns checkers e todos bateram como 100% IA. Claro que nada é totalmente certeiro, mas fica o aviso.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:15:28 PM
...
Atente sobre o uso da AI. Posts assim podem fazer vc perder sua conta.

Detalhe: Date Registered:   August 11, 2010, 02:24:01 PM

Temos um user bem antigo entre nós
Cuide bem da sua conta diggler  Wink
Não é sempre que temos alguém de 2010 registrado aqui

Faça posts orgânicos, participe, se tem dúvidas pergunte antes. Se você postar conteúdo de IA pode mesmo ser banido



19. Post 67089565 (unedited backup) (by examplens) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 16:19:01 CEST 2026) in DEX.fo — Automatic Crypto Exchange | No KYC/AML | BTC ETH XMR LTC DAI USDT | :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 01:38:37 PM
Unfortunately, this may get you banned from Bitcointalk. Mixers are not allowed to promote themselves on Bitcointalk, not even indirect promotion, if the service offers another service in addition to mixing.
You can find more about: Mixer restrictions
Thanks for sending this! We missed that!

I think it is safer to remain as an exchange to avoid scrutiny from the authorities as well.
You can offer a great private gain from swapping coins already

Forcing the user to make usdt > btc and then btc > usdt back already increases his privacy and makes your service stay as an exchange
Aside from the issue with the ban on this forum, I think that the "mixer feature" would be an unnecessary attraction of negative attention to the service. At the same time, accepting critical USDT has a special risk due to the possible blocking of coins by Tether.
The option was announced by the DEX strain as a conversion, and perhaps the closest would be, for example, a conversion from ERC20 to TRC20 or vice versa. Where it would be presented as the focus of switching the network on which the coins are. In a way, it wouldn't be direct mixing feature



20. Post 67089314 (unedited backup) (by Lucius) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 15:00:07 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: LoyceV on Today at 12:46:33 PM
This is how it was designed. Without your PIN, the seed doesn't leave the device.
I'm not buying it. The initial story was that your seed can't leave the device at all. Now it needs your PIN. What's stopping the firmware from not asking the PIN at all?

Quote
I am not using it, and i think it is a terrible feature.
But I see too much misinformation about this.
You're quoting Ledger, the company that lied that seed phrases could not leave the device. They're in the trust business, lying once means I'll never trust a word they say again.
~snip~

He's probably the only member of this forum who still thinks everyone else is spreading conspiracy theories when it comes to Ledger - the very fact that the seed can be remotely extracted from that device should have been a warning sign the moment the news was confirmed.

It's not a question of whether this "feature" will be abused one day, it's just a question of when it will happen. Given that this company still produces and sells devices, I would conclude that a very large number of those who use hardware wallets have no idea what risks they are exposed to.



21. Post 67089264 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 14:46:38 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 12:18:50 PM
This is how it was designed. Without your PIN, the seed doesn't leave the device.
I'm not buying it. The initial story was that your seed can't leave the device at all. Now it needs your PIN. What's stopping the firmware from not asking the PIN at all?

Quote
I am not using it, and i think it is a terrible feature.
But I see too much misinformation about this.
You're quoting Ledger, the company that lied that seed phrases could not leave the device. They're in the trust business, lying once means I'll never trust a word they say again.

Quote
Quote
Trezor looks to work in a poor RNG
What makes you say that?
This. ~
[/quote]
That image doesn't show anything about Trezor's Random Number Generator. It's well known that 12 seed words provide less entropy than 24 words, and that it's sufficient anyway. But you're free to stick to 24 words (that's what I did).

I've seen that picture before, they use "1022 years" and "many times longer than the age of the universe". That's weird, because "1022 years" is already 700 billion times longer than the age of the universe.



22. Post 67089208 (unedited backup) (by fillippone) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 14:27:26 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 12:18:50 PM

This. But I agree that it looks to have "enough" entropy, specially with a strong passphrase. But not as good as ledged for example.

I have seen discussion about this in other places, but couldn't find now.



If you had looked at this picture a quarter of an hour before the Coldcard exploit, it would have looked extremely different (if I am able to make myself understood).
What I mean is: again, you are trusting someone whose entropy is good. Why are you putting this trust in a scheme that has already failed once, instead of removing it in the first place?



23. Post 67088802 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 11:18:31 CEST 2026) in LoyceV's Merit data analysis (full data since Jan. 24, 2018; not just 120 days):

Weekly update (2026-08-21_Fri_05.18h)


theymos' raw data (format: time    amount    msg    user_from    user_to)
Sample
Code:
1787280017 1 5591547.msg67054620 3532301 3322606
1787279919 1 5589344.msg67065435 317618 2004043
1787279483 1 5591287.msg67065884 815246 926962
1787279357 1 178336.msg67065859 198573 120694
1787278860 2 5591106.msg67050515 3738700 3529017
1787277815 1 5591822.msg67062708 3489966 27470
1787277649 1 5590427.msg67042541 21131 27470
1787277134 1 5211864.msg67065728 1174868 2840905
1787275781 5 5591546.msg67065764 487418 941526
1787275393 4 5591546.msg67064063 487418 2810042
1787271054 2 5410469.msg60863972 1827294 1237156
1787269960 2 5591694.msg67063520 64507 2775483
1787268429 3 5591201.msg67065533 1554927 2004043
1787268002 1 5587663.msg66916032 3730340 3632432
1787267336 2 5591568.msg67056460 3714012 3710567
1787266915 3 5589411.msg66994485 3714012 2679380
1787266511 1 5591709.msg67059019 3749546 3698160
1787266405 1 5591810.msg67062312 3749546 755235
1787266073 1 5590579.msg67059398 535215 917552
1787265477 1 5479271.msg67065414 3528115 1593137
1787265004 2 5591874.msg67064883 1052091 3452791
1787263846 3 5590972.msg67033139 3357576 3454941
1787263699 1 5591390.msg67050089 333827 3701436
1787263614 1 5589344.msg67065285 2004043 2519096
1787263321 4 5581972.msg67065100 407174 1068464
1787263221 1 5479271.msg67061932 1593137 926962
1787263001 1 5564064.msg66922950 1052091 3625699
1787262804 2 5566307.msg67050201 1052091 3625699
1787262747 2 5590583.msg67018802 1052091 3567660
1787262684 1 5590583.msg67018658 1052091 3728749
1787262578 2 5571009.msg67061409 1052091 3625699
1787262428 1 5589344.msg67065285 995810 2519096
1787262045 1 5589344.msg67065285 2739454 2519096
1787261996 2 5590319.msg67009994 1052091 3730340
1787261924 2 5589316.msg66978094 1052091 3524230
1787261908 1 5589316.msg67010345 1052091 3730340
1787261776 1 5480251.msg67061114 1410401 912328
1787261602 2 5588332.msg67014528 1052091 3636671
1787261477 2 5591876.msg67065246 1052091 3571119
1787261476 20 5409616.msg60739122 1410401 3440279
1787261459 1 5591876.msg67065167 1052091 3561545
1787261420 9 5508967.msg64521130 1410401 3373825
1787261216 2 5585127.msg66924913 1052091 3636671
1787261148 1 5591793.msg67061608 1410401 3765795
1787261108 2 5573343.msg67064955 1052091 3575665
1787261019 2 5573343.msg66366513 1052091 3478833
1787260921 1 5573343.msg67061675 1052091 3575665
1787260730 2 5584652.msg66790303 1052091 3724416
1787260658 3 5584652.msg66915098 1052091 3636671
1787260334 1 5591777.msg67060894 516434 123824
.......
.......
.......
1516833930 7 2228.msg29479 135920 3
1516833833 1 178336.msg28855702 479624 1130992
1516833813 1 2817737.msg28849540 1001644 990403
1516833798 21 5.msg28 520313 3
1516833796 1 2808926.msg28728384 140584 35
1516833779 1 178336.msg28853916 479624 33156
1516833756 20 2482937.msg25417254 101872 135920
1516833713 21 5.msg28 169515 3
1516833686 1 2818179.msg28855276 994466 1196028
1516833610 49 1545652.msg15536651 206143 520313
1516833593 1 2818066.msg28855136 260067 520313
1516833592 2 2806168.msg28855427 520313 355846
1516833591 49 1545652.msg15536651 881377 520313
1516833523 1 2818066.msg28855343 539826 340795
1516833521 1 2818066.msg28855136 514126 520313
1516833478 1 2818066.msg28855136 482980 520313
1516833460 1 2818066.msg28854596 93844 520313
1516833451 1 2816214.msg28845827 1083353 1520388
1516833430 50 178608.msg28854963 884600 520313
1516833349 1 178336.msg28852898 479624 1521711
1516833346 1 2812863.msg28785611 303315 1707287
1516833329 1 2818066.msg28854596 206143 520313
1516833326 1 178336.msg28852768 479624 181806
1516833304 1 2818066.msg28853325 340795 877396
1516833289 1 2716104.msg28846824 1239985 1739247
1516833281 1 2818066.msg28853686 206143 136484
1516833252 1 2816647.msg28837916 169515 1701092
1516833251 1 178336.msg28849600 479624 172400
1516833237 1 2677441.msg28778318 123412 1090430
1516833230 1 2814078.msg28796083 520313 881377
1516833207 1 2772292.msg28837085 1189487 1028592
1516833203 1 2818066.msg28855136 101872 520313
1516833199 1 2818066.msg28853325 926641 877396
1516833148 1 2808926.msg28793321 78147 35
1516833148 1 2634042.msg28672219 123412 1094601
1516833111 1 2818066.msg28855136 535215 520313
1516833078 45 2813828.msg28801076 135920 101872
1516833070 1 2818066.msg28855136 881377 520313
1516833049 1 2677441.msg28848945 88254 903139
1516833048 1 2818066.msg28855136 101872 520313
1516833044 5 2818066.msg28855019 135920 688810
1516833001 5 2813828.msg28801076 135920 101872
1516832978 1 2384335.msg28854772 1344962 1101839
1516832969 1 2818066.msg28855136 881564 520313
1516832953 1 2818066.msg28854621 520313 101872
1516832934 1 2818066.msg28855136 877396 520313
1516832874 1 178608.msg28792130 884600 35
1516832842 5 2818066.msg28853325 688810 877396
1516832833 2 178336.msg28852079 479624 1257516
1516831941 1 2818066.msg28853325 35 877396
Full list* (58 MB) (not limited to 120 days, 3009 Merit transactions added since my previous update).

theymos' data (human readable format, including usernames and post titles)
Sample
On Fri 21 Aug 2026 04:40:17 AM CEST, SeriouslyGiveaway (history) sent 1 Merit to PrivacyG (history) for Re: Self-Custody vs Centralized Exchanges: Which Approach Makes More Sense?.
On Fri 21 Aug 2026 04:38:39 AM CEST, nutildah (history) sent 1 Merit to Zwei (history) for Re: Sigbanned user impulse709 owns at least four other accounts. .
On Fri 21 Aug 2026 04:31:23 AM CEST, iwantapony (history) sent 1 Merit to xLays (history) for Re: S a t R u s h . i o - Mine Bitcoin on Solana ⚡️Sat Strike🪙 1 mbtc Raffle! .
On Fri 21 Aug 2026 04:29:17 AM CEST, Hueristic (history) sent 1 Merit to xhomerx10 (history) for Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion.
On Fri 21 Aug 2026 04:21:00 AM CEST, KawasakiNinja1_ (history) sent 2 Merit to Out of mind (history) for Re: Buy Bitcoins for your children instead of building houses for them. .
.......
.......
.......
On Wed 24 Jan 2018 11:28:54 PM CET, AdolfinWolf (history) sent 1 Merit to Lutpin (history) for Re: What is the function of the "Merit" score?.
On Wed 24 Jan 2018 11:27:54 PM CET, Dahman El_Harrachi (history) sent 1 Merit to theymos (history) for Re: Forum ranks/positions/badges (What do those shiny coins under my name mean?).
On Wed 24 Jan 2018 11:27:22 PM CET, Tyrantt (history) sent 5 Merit to AdolfinWolf (history) for What is the function of the "Merit" score?.
On Wed 24 Jan 2018 11:27:13 PM CET, Last of the V8s (history) sent 2 Merit to Rosewater Foundation (history) for Re: Wall Observer BTC/USD - Bitcoin price movement tracking & discussion.
On Wed 24 Jan 2018 11:12:21 PM CET, theymos (history) sent 1 Merit to AdolfinWolf (history) for What is the function of the "Merit" score?.
Full list (610 MB)

Usernames to go with theymos' data
Sample
0: deMerit (Bitcoin Forum) (history) earned: 0 Merit.
3: satoshi (history) earned: 8880 Merit.
4: sirius (history) earned: 935 Merit.
10: Xunie (history) earned: 1 Merit.
11: madhatter (history) earned: 16 Merit.
.......
.......
.......
3765795: openbitcoin (history) earned: 1 Merit.
3765801: coinfuty (history) earned: 1 Merit.
3765834: Chief777 (history) earned: 5 Merit.
3765896: iloveDigit (history) earned: 8 Merit.
3765974: koilbuckethatbtc (history) earned: 1 Merit.
Full list* (11 MB)

Usernames machine readable
Sample
Code:
0: deMerit (Bitcoin Forum)
3: satoshi
4: sirius
10: Xunie
11: madhatter
12: nanaimogold
13: SmokeTooMuch
14: The Madhatter
21: AgoraMutual
23: 1 currency now
24: dwdollar
26: NewLibertyStandard
27: riX
28: Sabunir
29: giik
30: BitcoinFX
31: Suggester
33: m0mchil
34: BlueSky
35: theymos
37: soultcer
40: xc
42: ec
49: Cdecker
51: DannyM
97: dsg
101: Goldstein
143: laszlo
145: ducki2p
146: Brandon
163: Karmicads
182: Derrick
183: hugolp
198: allinvain
203: HostFat
206: teppy
217: SirArthur
224: Gavin Andresen
237: lachesis
241: QuantumMechanic
244: nixoid
251: wobber
262: chaord
267: virtualcoin
269: Bitcoiner
270: llama
271: Timo Y
274: limikael
284: joey.rich
288: Stone Man
.......
.......
.......
3762577: Sowat
3762578: sidrabtc
3762667: Luckiest
3762721: Fire_man
3762738: Prince patrick
3762844: monerica
3762860: PolarCrypto
3762899: Akos26
3763135: Geould
3763168: jaxx.bet
3763191: greysonz
3763248: xxxmourn
3763270: swapsslol
3763276: MegRewards
3763338: omenswap
3763404: Rmun1217
3763459: ohio_jaunt
3763560: paygate-love
3763611: Hazebet.co
3763618: rice_cooker
3763696: Gerdino
3763797: SCORAS
3763826: puzzle_72_worker
3763872: Danish Ali
3763895: Papa_Mojet
3764024: ColdcardVictim
3764049: OLDBOY 003
3764119: IntervalWalker
3764131: luocongjay
3764157: MrGambler531
3764227: Zeto Cash
3764541: Blockspins_Casino
3764562: Simeon1988
3764700: rajashek41
3764752: truedevil
3765001: nipperk
3765014: AnonymtNorskNr
3765018: slowLearner2
3765093: snapEX.pro
3765116: nico01
3765228: betski
3765300: SatRush.IO
3765335: 5btcnear
3765697: vegasocials
3765743: truffun
3765795: openbitcoin
3765801: coinfuty
3765834: Chief777
3765896: iloveDigit
3765974: koilbuckethatbtc
Full list (2 MB)

UserIDs, sent Merit and earned Merit machine readable
Sample
Code:
0:569:0
3:0:8880
4:0:935
10:0:1
11:0:16
12:0:2
13:3:96
14:0:13
21:0:2
23:0:1
24:0:9
26:0:19
27:0:54
28:0:13
29:0:4
30:380:800
31:0:1
33:0:27
34:0:4
35:14562:15033
37:0:6
40:0:4
42:0:69
49:0:5
51:0:2
97:0:2
101:0:2
143:0:2792
145:0:2
146:0:4
163:0:21
182:1:0
183:9:1
198:2:87
203:68:311
206:0:14
217:3:36
224:0:1494
237:0:6
241:0:9
244:0:1
251:0:1
262:0:1
267:0:2
269:0:2
270:0:57
271:0:1
274:0:42
284:0:6
288:0:11
.......
.......
.......
3762577:0:1
3762578:0:3
3762667:0:6
3762721:0:1
3762738:0:2
3762844:0:2
3762860:1:34
3762899:0:6
3763135:0:2
3763168:0:1
3763191:1:6
3763248:0:1
3763270:0:1
3763276:0:5
3763338:0:1
3763404:0:3
3763459:0:2
3763560:0:1
3763611:0:1
3763618:0:1
3763696:0:1
3763797:0:26
3763826:0:15
3763872:6:33
3763895:0:1
3764024:40:119
3764049:0:22
3764119:0:1
3764131:0:1
3764157:0:1
3764227:0:80
3764541:0:1
3764562:0:1
3764700:0:2
3764752:0:1
3765001:0:20
3765014:0:1
3765018:0:2
3765093:0:2
3765116:0:1
3765228:0:10
3765300:0:5
3765335:0:10
3765697:0:1
3765743:0:1
3765795:0:1
3765801:0:1
3765834:0:5
3765896:4:8
3765974:0:1
Full list (1 MB)

Total number of users who received 1 or more Merit: 51712
Sample
Code:
     1. 21505 Merit received by LoyceV (#459836) from 1123 unique users in 12471 transactions
     2. 21334 Merit received by fillippone (#1852120) from 773 unique users in 11649 transactions
     3. 18914 Merit received by o_e_l_e_o (#1188543) from 801 unique users in 9993 transactions
     4. 15655 Merit received by El duderino_ (#1067333) from 480 unique users in 8978 transactions
     5. 15033 Merit received by theymos (#35) from 1230 unique users in 5459 transactions
     6. 13885 Merit received by JayJuanGee (#252510) from 742 unique users in 9135 transactions
     7. 13344 Merit received by icopress (#1137579) from 620 unique users in 5002 transactions
     8. 12169 Merit received by cygan (#27470) from 539 unique users in 6215 transactions
     9. 12149 Merit received by LFC_Bitcoin (#379487) from 505 unique users in 6669 transactions
    10. 11957 Merit received by Symmetrick (#2627711) from 773 unique users in 6854 transactions
    11. 11472 Merit received by pooya87 (#379147) from 619 unique users in 6687 transactions
    12. 11378 Merit received by DdmrDdmr (#1582324) from 655 unique users in 6474 transactions
    13. 11368 Merit received by philipma1957 (#64507) from 590 unique users in 6535 transactions
    14. 10711 Merit received by nutildah (#317618) from 678 unique users in 5766 transactions
    15. 10529 Merit received by xhomerx10 (#120694) from 331 unique users in 5377 transactions
    16. 10465 Merit received by gmaxwell (#11425) from 347 unique users in 3816 transactions
    17. 10447 Merit received by TryNinja (#557798) from 568 unique users in 4639 transactions
    18. 10166 Merit received by NotATether (#2739424) from 545 unique users in 4689 transactions
    19. 10140 Merit received by GazetaBitcoin (#1285797) from 406 unique users in 3533 transactions
    20. 10060 Merit received by d5000 (#85033) from 464 unique users in 5479 transactions
    21. 10049 Merit received by BlackHatCoiner (#2775483) from 477 unique users in 5041 transactions
    22. 9316 Merit received by ABCbits (#359716) from 544 unique users in 5037 transactions
    23. 9009 Merit received by nc50lc (#1237156) from 413 unique users in 4652 transactions
    24. 8965 Merit received by Pmalek (#112493) from 587 unique users in 5326 transactions
    25. 8880 Merit received by satoshi (#3) from 413 unique users in 939 transactions
    26. 8829 Merit received by dkbit98 (#1410401) from 459 unique users in 5233 transactions
    27. 8542 Merit received by suchmoon (#234771) from 573 unique users in 4859 transactions
    28. 8251 Merit received by Rikafip (#2658890) from 465 unique users in 4527 transactions
    29. 7684 Merit received by bitmover (#1554927) from 596 unique users in 4573 transactions
    30. 7614 Merit received by 1miau (#2143453) from 496 unique users in 4138 transactions
    31. 7434 Merit received by AlcoHoDL (#998490) from 202 unique users in 4259 transactions
    32. 7316 Merit received by PowerGlove (#3486361) from 235 unique users in 1874 transactions
    33. 7198 Merit received by mikeywith (#2033515) from 405 unique users in 3671 transactions
    34. 7088 Merit received by cAPSLOCK (#35501) from 230 unique users in 4047 transactions
    35. 6966 Merit received by hosemary (#995810) from 408 unique users in 3842 transactions
    36. 6958 Merit received by DaveF (#300014) from 386 unique users in 3541 transactions
    37. 6900 Merit received by joker_josue (#97582) from 351 unique users in 3250 transactions
    38. 6804 Merit received by stompix (#164749) from 495 unique users in 3783 transactions
    39. 6794 Merit received by achow101 (#290195) from 278 unique users in 3046 transactions
    40. 6779 Merit received by Hhampuz (#881377) from 959 unique users in 4415 transactions
    41. 6727 Merit received by Lucius (#533583) from 535 unique users in 3890 transactions
    42. 6622 Merit received by Hueristic (#198573) from 208 unique users in 3832 transactions
    43. 6581 Merit received by OmegaStarScream (#375981) from 434 unique users in 3606 transactions
    44. 6503 Merit received by Charles-Tim (#2776678) from 438 unique users in 3803 transactions
    45. 6368 Merit received by The Sceptical Chymist (#487418) from 626 unique users in 3587 transactions
    46. 6277 Merit received by jeremypwr (#137185) from 223 unique users in 3653 transactions
    47. 6272 Merit received by NeuroticFish (#257071) from 462 unique users in 3495 transactions
    48. 6087 Merit received by n0nce (#3373858) from 196 unique users in 2649 transactions
    49. 5826 Merit received by lovesmayfamilis (#1982152) from 463 unique users in 4093 transactions
    50. 5802 Merit received by DireWolfM14 (#2003859) from 397 unique users in 2749 transactions
.......
.......
.......
 51663. 1 Merit received by 1ceStorm (#2342907) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51664. 1 Merit received by 1ce (#1019784) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51665. 1 Merit received by 1camtron (#1236351) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51666. 1 Merit received by 1apayment (#1855631) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51667. 1 Merit received by 1907KFY (#1935217) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51668. 1 Merit received by 16xypjnxlrew (#2705665) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51669. 1 Merit received by 16tonn (#3560052) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51670. 1 Merit received by 15horses1donkey (#560958) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51671. 1 Merit received by 15519028115Q (#3575647) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51672. 1 Merit received by 15262kk (#291561) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51673. 1 Merit received by 14z4rus (#3669471) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51674. 1 Merit received by 1453ist (#1431126) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51675. 1 Merit received by 1453eko (#1431103) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51676. 1 Merit received by 13Winter13 (#919666) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51677. 1 Merit received by 13ex07 (#1207068) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51678. 1 Merit received by 13dizel (#1208678) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51679. 1 Merit received by 1357924680 (#333305) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51680. 1 Merit received by 12tribes (#1221082) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51681. 1 Merit received by 12assa34 (#1729394) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51682. 1 Merit received by 123tm (#848549) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51683. 1 Merit received by 123pogi123 (#2252156) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51684. 1 Merit received by 123exo123 (#1919155) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51685. 1 Merit received by 112_blockchain (#2081987) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51686. 1 Merit received by 11:11pas (#1306783) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51687. 1 Merit received by 1083ivangod (#1952712) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51688. 1 Merit received by 101Crypta (#1287691) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51689. 1 Merit received by 100x (#80115) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51690. 1 Merit received by 100steeze (#3637720) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51691. 1 Merit received by 100%_Shared_FreeBitco.in (#2531436) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51692. 1 Merit received by 100monet (#323057) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51693. 1 Merit received by 1000x (#3509491) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51694. 1 Merit received by 1000usdforwife (#1547718) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51695. 1 Merit received by 1000alasan (#2458354) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51696. 1 Merit received by 0xMuted (#3713926) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51697. 1 Merit received by 0xBrian (#2625170) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51698. 1 Merit received by 0xb100d (#1342964) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51699. 1 Merit received by 0x77 (#3316521) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51700. 1 Merit received by 0x1Knowledge (#2000899) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51701. 1 Merit received by 0vx (#2805438) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51702. 1 Merit received by 0RajA0 (#1151527) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51703. 1 Merit received by 0nion (#3614135) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51704. 1 Merit received by 0bit (#493268) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51705. 1 Merit received by 063Myxa (#1432563) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51706. 1 Merit received by 05btc (#2050202) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51707. 1 Merit received by 00RedBlack00 (#2527578) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51708. 1 Merit received by 00hello (#2471124) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51709. 1 Merit received by $--Perfect. Exchange-$. (#1140007) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51710. 1 Merit received by $imple$imon (#2060672) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51711. 1 Merit received by $BitMakeR$ (#1166812) from 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 51712. 0 Merit received by gwsukabokepjepang (#2536607) from 2 unique users in 2 transactions
Full list (5 MB)

Total number of users who gave away 1 or more sMerit: 26745
Sample
Code:
     1. 77613 Merit sent by El duderino_ (#1067333) to 912 unique users in 13133 transactions
     2. 72788 Merit sent by fillippone (#1852120) to 2326 unique users in 32097 transactions
     3. 69604 Merit sent by LoyceV (#459836) to 3355 unique users in 18198 transactions
     4. 62856 Merit sent by JayJuanGee (#252510) to 3675 unique users in 60612 transactions
     5. 60713 Merit sent by ABCbits (#359716) to 4753 unique users in 34777 transactions
     6. 54807 Merit sent by vapourminer (#33156) to 3807 unique users in 37891 transactions
     7. 45834 Merit sent by hugeblack (#1059082) to 2940 unique users in 16221 transactions
     8. 41808 Merit sent by suchmoon (#234771) to 2887 unique users in 9159 transactions
     9. 39554 Merit sent by xandry (#382413) to 2547 unique users in 14607 transactions
    10. 38370 Merit sent by DdmrDdmr (#1582324) to 2966 unique users in 31070 transactions
    11. 36172 Merit sent by LFC_Bitcoin (#379487) to 1601 unique users in 14271 transactions
    12. 34063 Merit sent by klarki (#407174) to 2219 unique users in 11574 transactions
    13. 33333 Merit sent by Symmetrick (#2627711) to 2254 unique users in 16803 transactions
    14. 32926 Merit sent by The Sceptical Chymist (#487418) to 1496 unique users in 10475 transactions
    15. 30088 Merit sent by EFS (#140584) to 1468 unique users in 7889 transactions
    16. 29539 Merit sent by Welsh (#84521) to 1742 unique users in 6902 transactions
    17. 26646 Merit sent by o_e_l_e_o (#1188543) to 2510 unique users in 9360 transactions
    18. 25901 Merit sent by 1miau (#2143453) to 1317 unique users in 11630 transactions
    19. 25822 Merit sent by qwk (#24140) to 605 unique users in 6509 transactions
    20. 23619 Merit sent by pooya87 (#379147) to 1394 unique users in 9606 transactions
    21. 22424 Merit sent by dbshck (#153634) to 1314 unique users in 6442 transactions
    22. 18629 Merit sent by NotATether (#2739424) to 1809 unique users in 4177 transactions
    23. 17143 Merit sent by Julien_Olynpic (#1166480) to 571 unique users in 8071 transactions
    24. 16956 Merit sent by Vispilio (#982288) to 757 unique users in 6319 transactions
    25. 16860 Merit sent by nutildah (#317618) to 1762 unique users in 7697 transactions
    26. 16726 Merit sent by Pmalek (#112493) to 1206 unique users in 9474 transactions
    27. 16272 Merit sent by Halab (#1053119) to 2012 unique users in 6616 transactions
    28. 15384 Merit sent by Foxpup (#55384) to 647 unique users in 5513 transactions
    29. 15326 Merit sent by bitmover (#1554927) to 1337 unique users in 8594 transactions
    30. 14746 Merit sent by philipma1957 (#64507) to 1696 unique users in 7702 transactions
    31. 14562 Merit sent by theymos (#35) to 1113 unique users in 1791 transactions
    32. 14453 Merit sent by OgNasty (#18321) to 3168 unique users in 7586 transactions
    33. 13685 Merit sent by krogothmanhattan (#1000199) to 667 unique users in 3650 transactions
    34. 13615 Merit sent by CryptopreneurBrainboss (#1052091) to 1369 unique users in 7532 transactions
    35. 13593 Merit sent by dkbit98 (#1410401) to 1159 unique users in 8308 transactions
    36. 13561 Merit sent by paxmao (#1192397) to 1307 unique users in 5936 transactions
    37. 13454 Merit sent by NeuroticFish (#257071) to 834 unique users in 6312 transactions
    38. 13450 Merit sent by BlackHatCoiner (#2775483) to 855 unique users in 4328 transactions
    39. 12170 Merit sent by d5000 (#85033) to 1212 unique users in 6635 transactions
    40. 12114 Merit sent by chimk (#1202061) to 757 unique users in 4369 transactions
    41. 10800 Merit sent by mikeywith (#2033515) to 548 unique users in 3984 transactions
    42. 8915 Merit sent by Hueristic (#198573) to 592 unique users in 7549 transactions
    43. 8734 Merit sent by DarkStar_ (#507936) to 971 unique users in 2196 transactions
    44. 8712 Merit sent by bones261 (#452769) to 1032 unique users in 4239 transactions
    45. 8672 Merit sent by Buchi-88 (#204821) to 764 unique users in 7469 transactions
    46. 8660 Merit sent by babo (#65636) to 526 unique users in 6808 transactions
    47. 8645 Merit sent by Coolcryptovator (#1980983) to 1066 unique users in 3742 transactions
    48. 8442 Merit sent by BobLawblaw (#569455) to 333 unique users in 3402 transactions
    49. 8309 Merit sent by Xal0lex (#1068464) to 680 unique users in 2556 transactions
    50. 8282 Merit sent by OmegaStarScream (#375981) to 964 unique users in 3613 transactions
.......
.......
.......
 26696. 1 Merit sent by 3acaga (#1232502) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26697. 1 Merit sent by 360llqzc (#1300924) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26698. 1 Merit sent by 333btc (#3450760) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26699. 1 Merit sent by 3227jw (#2592839) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26700. 1 Merit sent by 2x2coindwarf (#2686612) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26701. 1 Merit sent by 2x25BT (#990097) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26702. 1 Merit sent by 2drive (#1304704) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26703. 1 Merit sent by 2andahalfBTC (#1142164) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26704. 1 Merit sent by 27QVUTZj8rgZP1 (#662730) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26705. 1 Merit sent by 27aume (#1001865) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26706. 1 Merit sent by 2342q6tegw (#1212678) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26707. 1 Merit sent by 214missy (#1285563) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26708. 1 Merit sent by 212fox (#1342293) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26709. 1 Merit sent by 1xbitpatnar (#3475604) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26710. 1 Merit sent by 1r0n (#1252002) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26711. 1 Merit sent by 1pool Ltd. (#2062862) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26712. 1 Merit sent by 1melyun (#543052) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26713. 1 Merit sent by 1cyrax00 (#964210) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26714. 1 Merit sent by 1CryptoSmurf (#1352746) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26715. 1 Merit sent by 1chempion123 (#1346880) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26716. 1 Merit sent by 1cak (#1136856) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26717. 1 Merit sent by 1amCrypt0 (#933826) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26718. 1 Merit sent by 19Nov16 (#921267) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26719. 1 Merit sent by 19nataliya12 (#1873934) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26720. 1 Merit sent by 19dimasik77 (#881779) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26721. 1 Merit sent by 1971ECPT (#3553473) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26722. 1 Merit sent by 17buratin (#1187494) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26723. 1 Merit sent by 13ex07 (#1207068) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26724. 1 Merit sent by 13Charlie (#76987) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26725. 1 Merit sent by 12retepnat34 (#1053271) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26726. 1 Merit sent by 10yearsolder (#1094878) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26727. 1 Merit sent by 10sat (#1162504) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26728. 1 Merit sent by 10casproj (#3515598) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26729. 1 Merit sent by 10BTCaDay (#396522) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26730. 1 Merit sent by 100kk (#1316426) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26731. 1 Merit sent by 100eth (#1324600) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26732. 1 Merit sent by 0xBitcoins (#2205183) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26733. 1 Merit sent by 0xBet (#3572636) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26734. 1 Merit sent by 0x0333 (#1913654) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26735. 1 Merit sent by 0vn1 (#1216048) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26736. 1 Merit sent by 0virtual (#1244555) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26737. 1 Merit sent by 0id1d (#3600764) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26738. 1 Merit sent by 0Alvaren0 (#2020991) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26739. 1 Merit sent by 01BTC (#1756786) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26740. 1 Merit sent by 01bits (#1629161) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26741. 1 Merit sent by 00HasH (#841746) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26742. 1 Merit sent by 00DKM@ (#1311705) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26743. 1 Merit sent by 00.00WIB (#3392171) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26744. 1 Merit sent by $@to$h! (#1183184) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
 26745. 1 Merit sent by $Talker (#1043705) to 1 unique users in 1 transactions
Full list (3 MB)

Merit per day of the week
Monday 343555 (14.41%)
Tuesday 342255 (14.36%)
Wednesday 341811 (14.34%)
Thursday 362441 (15.20%)
Friday 360674 (15.13%)
Saturday 314089 (13.17%)
Sunday 318267 (13.35%)
Total: 2383092


* This file will be overwritten by newer versions



24. Post 67088797 (unedited backup) (by fillippone) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 11:17:19 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:02:05 AM

And I firmly believe Ledger's key extraction scheme is a disaster waiting to happen. It'll go down the same way, except in Ledger's case, it'll be the devices themselves that get accessed. And when it happens, finally, people will realize it's stooooopid to think you can safely secure Bitcoin on a hardware wallet that can be accessed over the internet.

For now, the extraction must be physically authorized in the device. People who authorized are at risk, not sure about the others.

Which hardware wallet do you recommend , if any? Trezor looks to work in a poor RNG

I would recommend at least two steps: using an hardware wallet that hasn’t been using subpar practice, this mean avoid ledger, at least, and using one that supports your own entropy to generate the seed, via dice rolling, for example.
This, before moving to a multivendor, multi sign setup.



25. Post 67088796 (unedited backup) (by examplens) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 11:16:13 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: joker_josue on Today at 06:52:06 AM
He could have stealing 5-10 bitcoin per month for a few months, nobody would have noticed and blamed coldcard.

It could be done, but that would require planning. Something that, in my view, seems not to have existed.
In his defence, wouldn't he run the risk of someone else recognising this flaw at Coldcard in the meantime and emptying all the wallets?
In fact, how do we know that someone hasn't done it for months, but only now did this one appear who took everything.



26. Post 67088749 (unedited backup) (by LoyceV) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 10:55:13 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: retreat on August 27, 2026, 04:33:55 AM
Just reading this on reddit. It seems the hacker is trying to move the money but still not smart enough to do that.
Quote from: Wind_FURY on August 27, 2026, 05:29:44 AM
The "hacker" should have used ThorChain, and swapped the stolen Bitcoin to Monero
The hacker can read advice on what to do from all those people who call him "not smart enough" Tongue
From the Reddit screenshot: 64 BTC in, 54 BTC traced out. That means 10 BTC is now hidden (and people who had nothing to do with this hack now own 10 BTC from this hack).

Quote from: PrivacyG on August 27, 2026, 07:35:17 PM
I imagine the hacker sweating all over every time they wake up, still trying to find out the best way to do this.

But at this significant value, there is no thing they can do.  They would have to change their life significantly to be able to enjoy even some of that stolen money.  100,000 Dollars would have been a lot easier to manage.
There's nothing stopping him from just enjoying $100,000 instead of the full $100 million. $100k still buys a lot of blackjack and hookers Wink
Next, he'll buy a car wash in Albuquerque and lets his wife work there to launder the money.

Quote
I know what I would have done if I was this evil.
Me too. We'd be criminal masterminds if we'd be evil.
Image loading...
(image source)

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:02:05 AM
And I firmly believe Ledger's key extraction scheme is a disaster waiting to happen.
For now, the extraction must be physically authorized in the device.
Is that a hardware limitation, or is it just the firmware telling you you need to authorize it? I'm pretty sure a cracked firmware wouldn't need your consent, and thousands of hackers can peacefully try to hack the device from their own home.

Quote
Trezor looks to work in a poor RNG
What makes you say that?



27. Post 67088529 (unedited backup) (by Pmalek) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 08:54:25 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:02:05 AM
Which hardware wallet do you recommend , if any? Trezor looks to work in a poor RNG
What do you mean by Trezor working in a poor RNG?

I know from previous posts that Meuserna is a fan of hardware signers like Krux. Recently he has also been talking about the Seedsigner and its fork, the Shieldsigner. I think he uses encrypted seedQRs and multiple BIP85 child seeds generated offline that he exports and uses in other wallets.

Quote from: bitbollo on Today at 02:05:51 AM
A passphrase would be not enough if you are using a bad instruments like a coldcard. the fault was on hardware itself a password would just add a layer but the hacker already knows....
A long and complex passphrase is still non-hackable with today's technology. If a Coldcard-generated seed was additionally protected with a complex passphrase, the BTC would probably not be among the +1500 coins that got stolen. Some 2 and 3-word passphrases got bruteforced. An 8-word passphrase wouldn't be. An 8-word passphrase with numbers, lowercase & uppercase letters, and special characters even less so.



28. Post 67088523 (unedited backup) (by joker_josue) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 08:52:07 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 27, 2026, 08:54:36 AM
He could have stealing 5-10 bitcoin per month for a few months, nobody would have noticed and blamed coldcard.

It could be done, but that would require planning. Something that, in my view, seems not to have existed.

He continued with the feeling that he had found a possible flaw, and he ran a script that automatically transferred all the balance found. He was "lucky" that the first finds involved hundreds of BTC, not just a few dozen. He was ecstatic, and between that excitement and what I'm doing now, the script keeps running and generating more and more BTC.

I'm not saying this justifies action, only that the hacker himself was surprised by the success and didn't know what to do, leaving no room to create a plan beforehand.



Quote from: Stalker22 on August 27, 2026, 09:32:00 PM
~

This is all pure speculation.  There is nothing to back up the idea that an attacker of this level is sitting around sweating, or taking advice from ChatGPT.  On what basis do you make such assumptions?

Of course, we're all speculating. But, based on the behavior, it's clear there was no planning involved regarding what to do with the stolen coins. This is not typical behavior for most hackers looking to steal bitcoins.

Time was crucial for "cleaning" these coins. If the robbery had been well planned, he would have started cleaning them minutes or a few hours after stealing the coins. But instead, he continued hoarding everything at the same addresses. Until the theft was discovered and became public.

From the moment this type of theft becomes public, all identified stolen coins are placed under a very high and rigorous level of surveillance. It is very difficult now to hide hundreds (thousands) of bitcoins quickly and effectively.

Any strategy that is applied, even on a small scale, will be exposed in detail, making its continuation difficult. That's why, after almost a month, everything remains practically the same. The more time passes, the worse it gets, because more resources will be allocated to monitoring those BTCs.

The Bitcoin community is known for being very analytical. I've seen guys doing incredibly thorough investigations for much smaller amounts of money.





29. Post 67088262 (unedited backup) (by God Of Thunder) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 04:47:07 CEST 2026) in Bitz.io || Free Raffle 🎟️ – $65 Prize Pool 💰:


Winner:
17 - Agathamay

Winner 2:
10 - Ricardo11

Winner 3:
37 - ovcijisir

Verify here

Please send me your Bitz.io Bitcoin deposit address in a private message.



30. Post 67087915 (unedited backup) (by Meuserna) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 00:39:55 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitbollo on Today at 09:39:53 AM
Probably this was already happening since there are severeal online claims of users that have their btc lost using this hardware.
... nobody would have noticed and blamed coldcard.
it could be not excluded that they have just collected the majority of the keys before claiming the whole attack.

That is exactly what I believe happened. And it's what I believe will happen again when Ledger's firmware gets hacked, because Ledger's firmware contains a key extraction API.

I said this, two years ago:

Quote from: Meuserna on September 12, 2024, 04:24:24 AM
When Ledger's key extraction code gets hacked, the hackers aren't going to drain wallets right away because they're not going to want to let Ledger know they've been hacked.  The hackers are going to want to keep the exploit a secret while they steal as many keys as they can, because the moment Ledger finds out they've been hacked, Ledger can start working on a patch, which would stop hackers from stealing more keys.

Reread that paragraph if you didn't understand what I just said.

Hackers won't want Ledger to patch the buggy code.  Hackers will want to steal as many users keys as possible before draining wallets, because when they start draining wallets Ledger will find out they've been hacked.

When Ledger gets hacked, or when YOU get hacked, you're not going to know.  In fact, there's no way for you to know if hackers already have your keys.  I doubt that they do, but since there's no way to know, it means you're not safe using Ledger hardware or software, and you're not safe using a seed that has ever been used on Ledger hardware or software.

I won't be surprised at all if we eventually find out the ColdCard thief found the exploit months ago and was building up a list of wallets to hit.

And I firmly believe Ledger's key extraction scheme is a disaster waiting to happen. It'll go down the same way, except in Ledger's case, it'll be the devices themselves that get accessed. And when it happens, finally, people will realize it's stooooopid to think you can safely secure Bitcoin on a hardware wallet that can be accessed over the internet.



31. Post 67087873 (unedited backup) (by jpouza) (scraped on Fri Aug 28 00:28:19 CEST 2026) in Abertura do algoritmo do X expõe perfis de políticos brasileiros censurados:

Quote from: bitmover on August 17, 2026, 01:51:25 PM
Não entendi o motivo da lista

Estava olhando isso ontem.. é basicamente para atender à legislação brasileira..
Não é  de hoje que as restrições afetam mais a direita.

Olha essa notícia  334 a 10  , nas eleicoes de 2022
https://noticias.uol.com.br/ultimas-noticias/agencia-estado/2022/10/21/tse-remove-334-postagens-bolsonaristas-contra-lula-e-10-do-pt-contra-o-presidente.htm

A eleição desse ano tera muita censura. Pois todo o sistema trabalha para manter a situação atual.

Nao vejo possibilidade do bolsonaro ou de uma terceira via ganhar. A dúvida é se o pais aguenta mais 4 anos sem um calote da divida pública, ou uma recessão estilo Dilma, ou hiper inflacao, algo pesado ira acontecer se tudo se mantiver nesse rumo

Não aguenta, final de 2027 já implode, parabéns aos envolvidos.




32. Post 67086991 (unedited backup) (by Forsyth Jones) (scraped on Thu Aug 27 19:55:43 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitbollo on Today at 09:39:53 AM
Probably this was already happening since there are severeal online claims of users that have their btc lost using this hardware.
... nobody would have noticed and blamed coldcard.
it could be not excluded that they have just collected the majority of the keys before claiming the whole attack.
it worth mention that there are more "patterns" of attackers, probably there isn't only one cluster/user.

[I read some retard comment about "white hacker" trying to using the same exploit for "save bitcoin from the black hacker" Roll Eyes ]

The amount stolen doesn't look so basic or easy to hide.
Probably we are just not ready to understand and assimilate this issue...
The first has been to underestimate the risk on rely on third parties.
The second has been completely voided the concept of trust - I trust another entity making hardwares and not just my self using a tutorial
Third, if bitcoin would become what we are expecting, it's clear that any amount could become impressively precious.
Forth (worst point) this has been used as wrench for attacking self custody and continue to blame on people that want have their sovereignity managing bitcoin in totally autonomy.
What madness, this case is likely to drag on for months/years and become a new ghost like the MtGox hack (with the difference that the money is in the hands of the criminal and not the police or government).

A sad story for self-custody, but let it serve as a lesson: use a passphrase when using hardware wallets What madness, this case is likely to drag on for months/years and become a new ghost like the MtGox hack (with the difference that the money is in the hands of the criminal and not the police or government).

A sad story for self-defense, but let it serve as a lesson: use a passphrase when using hardware wallets and prefer truly open source HW or software wallets, don't fully trust the wallet generator, verify, and if you don't know how to verify code, at least use a passphrase and BIP-85, knowing these things is a matter of survival, don't fully trust the wallet generator, verify it, and if you don't know how to verify the code, at least use a passphrase and BIP-85, knowing such things is a matter of survival.



33. Post 67086619 (unedited backup) (by diggler) (scraped on Thu Aug 27 17:50:13 CEST 2026) in Como comprar Solana (SOL) 100% sem KYC?:

Passando para deixar um MUITO obrigado especial ao bitmover pelo Merit! Fiquei extremamente honrado com o reconhecimento vindo de um veterano tão respeitado da nossa comunidade, logo nesses meus primeiros posts, irei para a escola muito feliz.  Roll Eyes



34. Post 67085658 (unedited backup) (by bitbollo) (scraped on Thu Aug 27 11:39:55 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Probably this was already happening since there are severeal online claims of users that have their btc lost using this hardware.
Quote from: bitmover on Today at 08:54:36 AM
... nobody would have noticed and blamed coldcard.
it could be not excluded that they have just collected the majority of the keys before claiming the whole attack.
it worth mention that there are more "patterns" of attackers, probably there isn't only one cluster/user.

[I read some retard comment about "white hacker" trying to using the same exploit for "save bitcoin from the black hacker" Roll Eyes ]

The amount stolen doesn't look so basic or easy to hide.
Probably we are just not ready to understand and assimilate this issue...
The first has been to underestimate the risk on rely on third parties.
The second has been completely voided the concept of trust - I trust another entity making hardwares and not just my self using a tutorial
Third, if bitcoin would become what we are expecting, it's clear that any amount could become impressively precious.
Forth (worst point) this has been used as wrench for attacking self custody and continue to blame on people that want have their sovereignity managing bitcoin in totally autonomy.



35. Post 67085135 (unedited backup) (by ryzaadit) (scraped on Thu Aug 27 06:02:13 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 26, 2026, 10:52:27 AM
This is what signing a message was created for.
But, other people could have the keys as well.
-snip
How about the signed message from the previous transaction before the sweeps?

Pretty sure the majority of the addresses are dormant addresses before they got sweeps, peopel are usually send their BTC after they got the hardware wallet > created the seed & wallet  > then send the BTC > and leave it for such a long time.

They fill it the fund with either sending from another address or buying it from the exchange.



36. Post 67084380 (unedited backup) (by suzanne5223) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 22:17:31 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: Wind_FURY on Today at 07:52:49 AM
I imagine there is likely more than one class action being cooked up.
Would they have deep enough pockets for this? I can imagine they spent a lot of money on marketing, sales and the actual product, while they didn't sell that many devices. So if all buyers want their money back, they don't have that amount. If the victims want their losses compensated, they won't have that kind of money it either.

I wonder if they will be able to find the users who now hold those 1500 btc. One small mistake when spending, even in a kyc free exchange (like an ip leak),  might expose their identities

Tell will tell if someone from coldcard is involved


That ColdCard CTO who made an anonymous account and he was talking to the account - HIMSELF, in Github is already a red flag in my opinion.

This issue should definitely be investigated. Users have lost their savings because of developer-INCOMPETENCE or developers being BAD ACTORS.
Yes, he's a red flag, but we can talk about the unprofessional service provided by the Coldcard team and not talk about people who spent weeks assisting Bitcoin holders who were affected by the Coldcard vulnerability by helping them to transfer their funds to safety, with the estimation of tens of millions of dollars worth of BTC protected during the period the Coldcard vulnerability occurred.
https://x.com/BitcoinNewsCom/status/2092703792944808228



37. Post 67083895 (unedited backup) (by joker_josue) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 19:22:25 CEST 2026) in Todas hardware wallets sofreram grandes problemas. Qual a solução?:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:26:37 PM

Acho que é aproveitar os momentos de ATH para vender, se for o caso. Vender antes de surgir a necessidade.

Agora por exemplo não é boa hora para vender, na minha opiniao

passando de 100k USD (ou 500k reais) começa a ficar mais atrativo, e se vc estiver precisando criar uma reserva para emergencias, pode ser uma boa hora.

Muitas vezes quando não há necessidade, nem se pensa em vender. Porque se vender, vai colocar o dinheiro onde.
Claro que existem sempre alternativas, mas Bitcoin é Bitcoin.

No final, nunca se sabe o momento certo de vender ou comprar. Então eu sempre tive a ideia de ir usado, quando realmente acho que preciso usar, sem olhar muito para se está a subir ou descer. Claro que também não vou às cegas, mas tento equilibrar a coisa, sem ficar muito obsecado com o valor.



38. Post 67083835 (unedited backup) (by rdluffy) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 19:04:07 CEST 2026) in Seed Generation in Hardware Wallets:

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 11:59:03 PM
...

Entropy wasn't something "sexy" to talk about before this coldcard incident. I think ledger lost a lot of customers, who migrate to coldcard and trezor. Now, trezor entropy revealed to be inferior to competitors, they might be trying to fix this.

At least I hope this incident serves as a lesson so that nothing like this ever happens again
If that happens, it will at least be a step forward for security

I ended up regenerating some wallets I had here, including my Trezor, where instead of 12 words, I generated a 24-word seed with a passphrase
I hope I won’t have to regenerate them and move everything again, but if Trezor improves the entropy, I’ll end up doing it again

My Ledger wallet was already generated with 24 words, I think that was standard back then, so I didn’t change anything on that one



39. Post 67083611 (unedited backup) (by sabotag3x) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 17:54:07 CEST 2026) in GTA IV com 20% de CASHBACK pelo cartão EtherFi:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 11:52:14 AM
Se voce depositar R$ 50mil no Nubank por exemplo

Calma, calma Cheesy estou querendo usar US$ 50,00 para assinar serviços online com esses cartões.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 11:52:14 AM
E quando o ganho é de 3%, acaba que dura apenas 2-3 meses para atrair dinheiro e clientes e depois o cartão fica ruim.

Lembro que um tempo atrás rolou uma treta assim com os cartões da CryptoCom.. eles tinham vários "planos" que você precisava bloquear a moeda deles, etc. para ter cashbacks maiores.. mas ai, do nada, cortaram vários benefícios e a galera ficou puta..

Pelo menos, não estou vendo essa prática nesses novos cartões.



40. Post 67083605 (unedited backup) (by Forsyth Jones) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 17:52:25 CEST 2026) in Software Wallet - Discussões e Novidades:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 11:31:56 AM
Por que você teria chaves privadas que não vieram de HD wallets? Queria entender.

Você não usava bitcoin na época em que isso existia. Hoje em dia só quem tem vanity addresses ou quer recuperar forks (coisa que já não existe faz tempo tb) que precisaria mexer com private keys individualmente
Cara, basicamente o que você e os outros estão propondo lá é que quem quiser que uma imported key/wallet se comporte em relação ao troco é uma solução remediável, não a que corta o problema na raiz, usando o pay to many apontando ! pro endereço de troco, não cara. E se eu quiser gastar de um ou mais outputs que está lá na outra carteira, a HD padrão e quiser juntar com o private key importado, eu não quero ter que expor as chaves privadas da conta HD, pra importar na carteira de chaves importados só pra fazer a transação, está vendo que não resolve, só cria mais problema?

Mas parece que meu esforço de argumentar é em vão, eu não gosto dessa ideia de que: "ah só porque ele é um user avançado, ele que se vire", não é assim, é fato que reutilizar um endereço é um problema de privacidade e até de segurança, a premissa básica de uma carteira bitcoin é de não reutilizar um endereço, por que o mesmo argumento desaparece no caso de quem usa paper wallet ou por algum motivo usa um endereço importado?

Não importa o que o usuário faz com a chave, o que importa é se tem solução pro caso de uso dele (bitcoin core já tem), mas eu posso usar o bitcoin core porque tenho espaço no SSD, mas eu aposto que a maioria das pessoas não tem, se houvesse mais carteiras com o mesmo comportamento do Core já resolveria.



41. Post 67083324 (unedited backup) (by Forsyth Jones) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 16:15:37 CEST 2026) in Import Private Keys: why is this feature so misused in wallets that support it?:

Quote from: joker_josue on Today at 06:51:54 AM
I understand the idea. But the question is: how does Electrum know which is my "default" HD wallet?

For Electrum, each HD wallet is viewed independently. That's why when you open two wallets, they open in different windows.
Furthermore, there is no default wallet. The wallet that appears when you start Electrum is the last wallet you had open.

A user can have 10 HD wallets, even saved in different system folders. How would Electrum know which address exists in wallet X, if it doesn't even know that wallet exists, unless it's open?

The only way to do this was to indicate in the settings that wallet X was the primary one.
But by doing that, wouldn't it become more dangerous in terms of privacy? Because it could create connections between wallets.
This is just one of the proposals that came up in this discussion. I don't think it's feasible, as it's complicated and currently, as far as I remember, no wallet currently does or has implemented this. But let's say it were implemented, you just need to add any of the options below (one or more) in advanced sending to:




But I keep hammering the point that:

The best solution for this was initially proposed by SomberNight, the creation of an advanced wallet with support for multiple scripts (or not) that would allow the import of private keys as well, and Electrum sends the change spent from that address to the HD account, period, simple to solve and painless.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 10:40:02 AM
I would not consider this a workaround. This is a basic wallet feature, which people use everyday.
It is the native way of the wallet to solve the problem you mentioned, the address reuse in case of change.
I'm not saying that pay to many is a workaround, I'm saying that using it specifically to designate the change is a workaround, there's a big difference between the purpose of pay to many and change addr.

Basically, the way Electrum handles my imported keys today is exactly like this:

"Here, we created a rented room for you (imported-only keystore, privkey-only or addresses watch-only), but there's no balcony because we don't know if you're stupid enough to want to jump out the balcony, while other residents are VIPs (HD wallets) and have balconies, terraces, and rooftop pools, because we assume they know what they're doing. If you don't like it, rent another apartment (use another wallet) or buy ours (do a sweep transferring everything to the HD wallet)."

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 10:40:02 AM
The wallet doesn't force you to reuse the address, even when you import a private key.
Of course, it forces me to, when I import a private key (creating a keystore called "imported" only for private keys and not public addresses), the change goes back to the imported key (bad for privacy), even if I enable use change addresses the wallet sends the change to a random address if there's more than one imported key. This isn't ideal either and just messes things up. In other words, it forces me to use this imported keystore that doesn't communicate with the standard HD or BIP39 imported keystores, with a "use change addresses" function that works in a stupid way, trying to guess where the change to a new virgin address goes, much worse than when they removed the import feature from the deterministic HD keystores (electrum v2.0).

The solution to all this is very simple:


To be clear, my intention is not to use imported addresses forever, I would just like the imported keys to have same behavior as HD wallets regarding change and non-reuse. I'm thinking of users who use paper wallets who wish to use reliable software like Electrum or any other wallet like Bluewallet, preserving their privacy. The funds would be temporarily transferred to the HD keystore, which has paths for receiving /0 and changing /1, so that they can then transfer everything to a paper wallet or other cold storage, or why not, transfer directly to an integrated hardware wallet?  Smiley

In my view, the best way to solve this would be to add an option to create an advanced wallet with support for multiple types of scripts and descriptors for users who know how to handle descriptors. As I've said many times, I'm being repetitive, seriously, it shouldn't be complicated to understand my reasoning.



42. Post 67083217 (unedited backup) (by rdluffy) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 15:35:55 CEST 2026) in Todas hardware wallets sofreram grandes problemas. Qual a solução?:

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 03:00:07 PM
Ja pensou quanto teria de tivesse feito hold de tudo que ganhou aqui nos fóruns ate hoje?

Acho que essa é uma bao reflexão

Não me torture  Cheesy Cheesy Cheesy
Mas tenho alguns punhados de satoshis que guardei de campanhas passadas
É legal ver que uma campanha de 60 dólares no passado, virou 3x mais nos valores de hoje  Smiley

Quote from: alegotardo on Today at 01:39:27 AM
Se eu, tivesse guardado só o que ganhei com as campanhas, já estaria aposentado vivendo de rendimentos e ainda sobraria para investir!
Mas, eu não penso só nisso, como já contei algumas vezes, o que ganhei com Bitcoin aqui e em outros lugares me salvou de uma crise financeira ferrenha uns anos atrás, se não fosse por ele eu acho que teria perdido até meu veiculo na época.

Somos holders, mas Bitcoin não é pra se levar pro caixão e esperar alguém secar quando a computação quântica chegar... é sobre realizar sonhos ou te salvar de perrengues quando necessário.

Acho que você já contou essa história uma vez aqui e acho incrível como o BTC pode servir em momentos de dificuldade, sem que você precise pegar empréstimo, pedir a alguém, vender algo importante seu...

Eu tenho muito dificuldade de vender meus satoshis, espero nunca precisar vender por necessidade, mas é uma segurança boa ter algo para liquidar 



43. Post 67082679 (unedited backup) (by EstherBtc) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 12:06:20 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: avp2306 on August 25, 2026, 03:35:44 PM
Would they have deep enough pockets for this? I can imagine they spent a lot of money on marketing, sales and the actual product, while they didn't sell that many devices. So if all buyers want their money back, they don't have that amount. If the victims want their losses compensated, they won't have that kind of money it either.

I wonder if they will be able to find the users who now hold those 1500 btc. One small mistake when spending, even in a kyc free exchange (like an ip leak),  might expose their identities

Tell will tell if someone from coldcard is involved
Well, there are indications that the hacker made a mistake and exposed information about himself. Activities were recognised where the operator used a paid account on a "well-known" blockchain service. A pattern of querying the original addresses was observed during the attack and this was repeated.

https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/08/19/block-and-galaxy-research-give-lead-to-law-enforcement-in-111m-coldcard-bitcoin-theft/

Now that they already traced the hacker, its good to see what other action they made. Because many people are so curious about this case, they want those people involve in this hacking issue to get captured.

Maybe this is also the reason why the funds stolen has left unmoved? https://crypto.news/coldcard-hackers-leave-87-of-stolen-bitcoin-unmoved-after-114m-theft they are maybe afraid to do transaction because it can create fresh traces to the authorities.

They should act fast, so they can still recover the funds and return it back to those proven victims.

The question now remains, how will the victims prove that their bitcoin was stolen?
Since there is no kyc to be able to identify owners?



44. Post 67082574 (unedited backup) (by tvbcof) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 11:25:13 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 10:30:51 AM
I am not a lawyer, but according to the official story (which studiously avoids any 'conspiracy theories') I'm not really sure I see a crime here.
...
You don't see a crime in transfering 1500 BTC (millions of dollars) from random people to your own wallet? What are you talking about.

Shades of the Owens/Wilson debate here.  'Can you name a charge?'

Of course I am playing devil's advocate (aka, trolling) to some degree, but it's also a serious question to answer prior to contemplating legal action.

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 10:30:51 AM
It is the same as hacking a bank app and transferring money to your own account.

Here is my opinion from a bona-fide O.G. standpoint.  There is a huge difference in that fiat currency is, pretty much by definition, backed by the state.  They have an obligation to expend resource in defense of their authorization of chosen central bank's 'liability' (which is what we call money.)  Such a thing was never expected and never requested by the Bitcoin community (in earlier times at least) and 'we' would do nothing but laugh in the faces of those who lost their savings through, say, inflation.

If the state enforcement apparatus is required to expend resources to recover funds from hardware wallet mis-haps then they have every right to demand that all such devices are submitted for public use certification prior to use.  I would hope to hell that very very few people would want that.

The 'law' in Bitcoinland has always been 'not your keys, not your coin', and very few people would have missed that message...though more than a few may have not dwelt on it long enough to have imparted meaningful mental impact.

I would be amenable to the argument that stealing _anything_ is illegal, and since we all pay taxes, we all deserve efforts by the state to to right such a wrong in a general sort of a way.  (If I were the opponents attorney I would argue that the plaintiff dropped the items in question on the ground and the accused simply picked them up.)  I just wouldn't bet a lot of money that a lot of effort resources would be expended.

Now, if things progress into 'conspiritard territory' and evidence of collusion between some of the parties emerges, we very well may be looking at some serious charges.  But we are not there yet as far as I can see, and with everyone chasing their tails, I seriously doubt that we ever will be.




45. Post 67082338 (unedited backup) (by Wind_FURY) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 09:52:49 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 24, 2026, 09:13:25 PM
I imagine there is likely more than one class action being cooked up.
Would they have deep enough pockets for this? I can imagine they spent a lot of money on marketing, sales and the actual product, while they didn't sell that many devices. So if all buyers want their money back, they don't have that amount. If the victims want their losses compensated, they won't have that kind of money it either.

I wonder if they will be able to find the users who now hold those 1500 btc. One small mistake when spending, even in a kyc free exchange (like an ip leak),  might expose their identities

Tell will tell if someone from coldcard is involved


That ColdCard CTO who made an anonymous account and he was talking to the account - HIMSELF, in Github is already a red flag in my opinion.

This issue should definitely be investigated. Users have lost their savings because of developer-INCOMPETENCE or developers being BAD ACTORS.



46. Post 67081940 (unedited backup) (by m2017) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 05:13:31 CEST 2026) in Seed Generation in Hardware Wallets:

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 11:59:03 PM
I don't know if you've seen this Trezor response


https://x.com/Trezor/status/2089697469042979060

I found it really interesting, they're considering offering the option to roll the dice for entropy

Entropy wasn't something "sexy" to talk about before this coldcard incident. I think ledger lost a lot of customers, who migrate to coldcard and trezor. Now, trezor entropy revealed to be inferior to competitors, they might be trying to fix this.
Does trezor really have a choice? If their entropy lags behind that of competitors, they will lose marketing ground (market share). Especially after the Coldcard incident, users will be extremely particular about such details.

In short, HW's manufacturers  (all of them) have no choice in the sense that they must constantly improve their devices and seek ways to enhance reliability. If generating the seed-phrase using dice "strengthens" trezor, then so be it (if only they don't break anything Smiley).

Trezor owners will await the addition of this feature and prepare to migrate their crypto-assets.



47. Post 67081836 (unedited backup) (by alegotardo) (scraped on Wed Aug 26 03:39:31 CEST 2026) in Todas hardware wallets sofreram grandes problemas. Qual a solução?:

Quote from: bitmover on August 25, 2026, 03:00:07 PM
Ja pensou quanto teria de tivesse feito hold de tudo que ganhou aqui nos fóruns ate hoje?

Acho que essa é uma bao reflexão

Se eu, tivesse guardado só o que ganhei com as campanhas, já estaria aposentado vivendo de rendimentos e ainda sobraria para investir!
Mas, eu não penso só nisso, como já contei algumas vezes, o que ganhei com Bitcoin aqui e em outros lugares me salvou de uma crise financeira ferrenha uns anos atrás, se não fosse por ele eu acho que teria perdido até meu veiculo na época.

Somos holders, mas Bitcoin não é pra se levar pro caixão e esperar alguém secar quando a computação quântica chegar... é sobre realizar sonhos ou te salvar de perrengues quando necessário.



48. Post 67081035 (unedited backup) (by criptoevangelista) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 22:05:01 CEST 2026) in CAMPANHAS DE ASSINATURAS ATUALIZADAS:

Quote from: bitmover on August 20, 2026, 06:45:36 PM
E eu ainda fico mais impressionado com a galera que mantém cinco, seis, sete contas, várias contas, às vezes até dezenas de contas, tentando pegar o máximo de campanhas possíveis.

Essa semana rolou algo parecido lá no X.. a comunidade denunciou um perfil que só roubava conteúdo de outras pessoas..

No fim, um funcionário do Musk descobriu que o cara estava participando com mais de 10 contas no programa de recompensa deles para criadores de conteúdo.. disse que o cara ganhou mais de US$ 250.000 (R$ 1,3 milhão!!) nos últimos dois anos.

Como que funciona esse programa de recompensa pra criador de conteudos?
Me parece bastante lucrativo, mesmo para quem nao fraude o sistema com muitas contas.

Voce tem o link.?

Então, acho que é bem lucrativo mesmo, se não me engano alguem a um tempo atrás comentou que a disruptivas abandonou o fórum para se dedicar mais ao twitter pois la as possibildiades de pagamento eram bem melhores... para quem tem bastante seguidores deve valer realmente bem a pena, financeiramente falando e tambem as oportunidades de networking que devem rolar por la...

eu tenho minha conta la desde 2010 e uso bem pouco, hoje em dia apenas para ler as coisas, mas eu acho o twitter muito exagerado e polarizado, é muita gente falando muita merda a todo momento.



49. Post 67080524 (unedited backup) (by Forsyth Jones) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 19:35:19 CEST 2026) in Import Private Keys: why is this feature so misused in wallets that support it?:

I’m very disappointed that you think this way, but let's move on. I’ll try to answer each of you.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 01:21:35 AM
I agree that considering a new wallet for each imported private key isnt a good solution
One alternative for the change address is to fully spend the recovered coins to a HD wallet.
When you say "recovered",  you're referring to importing, right? If so, yes, e.g:
HD Account #0 (default) – Change from imported keys goes here.
HD Account #1
HD Account #2
Imported – whatever is spent from this keystore, the remaining balance (change) is sent to one of the keystores above or some keystore chosen by the user, it’s a sort of wallet creation feature within advanced options. SomberNight (one of Electrum's main devs) has already hinted at something like this: https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/6016

That already solves part of the problem.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 01:21:35 AM
But the days of saving private keys are gone. Since bip 39 and hd wallets (2013!) There is no reason to save private keys individually. Sometimes you might want to do that to recover forked coins or some other very specific usage.
bitmover, just because "no one" uses isolated keys anymore doesn't mean we have to kill the feature at all. If we followed that logic, we would kill the sweep feature too, since no one prints paper wallets anymore. Yet you still see a large number of wallets supporting that feature. That’s not how things are solved.
Self-custody is also about maintaining legacy restoration and handling methods. As I’ve said, there will always, always, be use cases different from yours or the majority of users.

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 01:21:35 AM
I hardly think wallets will try to improve user experience in importing private keys individually.  Bip 39 seeds are way better for 99% of the situations
If no one flags it to them, they certainly won't do it. BIP39 seed phrases are great, but that’s not the discussion here.



Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
The wallets like Electrum are deterministic which means when you create a wallet all the keys inside that wallet are supposed to be derived from a seed.
I know that wallets generated by Electrum are deterministic. I mentioned "HD" 03 times in the OP.

Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
If they allow you to import a separate key into that same wallet file, then it will contain a single key that cannot be derived from that seed and cannot be recovered by it either. It also creates complications for other parts of the code which need to take that into consideration.
That’s not true, as I said, Electrum had this feature before v2.0, watch this video, and Bitcoin Core works exactly the way I described, so it is possible to implement it without breaking other parts of the code.

Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
So it is easier to force the user to create a separate wallet that consists of all imported keys and has no seed.

With the design I explained above, the wallet without a seed cannot "derive" any new keys to be used for change. So you have 2 options: (1) manually select a change address (2) use your wallet with seed and sweep the key instead of importing it. After that each spend will create a change address.
No, nothing forced is acceptable in a self-custody environment, so such a thing shouldn't be acceptable. If at least the imported wallet keystore worked in a way that let the user choose where the change goes (like the scenario I suggested above  to bitmover) or specify an output address... but no, it works in a completely lousy way, ended up reusing addresses.

Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
Reusing address is not recommended but it is not as terrible as you think. Specially from a security perspective, as long as the wallet you are using is not broken there is no reason to attack your keys just because you revealed the public key and if it is broken then you should not be using it for anything let alone for this.
Just because something is not as terrible as I think it is, that doesn't mean we should just give up and not follow security best practices. I’m not worried about being attacked, I just wish the wallet I’m using offered at least the options I mentioned. That’s all. Is that too much to ask?

I’m not asking Electrum to create isolated keys the way Core used to, I’m just asking for at least an "advanced wallet" option in Electrum that allows for importing private keys and addresses, and gives the user 100% control over where the change goes (or, by default, sends it to an HD account pre-selected by the software). SomberNight has already expressed interest in this: implement advanced wallet option: multiple xpubs, mixed script types, and similar (maybe with output script descriptors)

Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
They did. In early versions, each key was created randomly therefore the wallet file had to be backed up again after each key generation (it generated multiple at a time though).
In later versions, they made it deterministic meaning new keys were still generated using that original seed (seed is the entropy used for child key derivation, not to me confused with mnemonic).

Quote from: pooya87 on Today at 04:41:45 AM
And exactly because in bitcoin core you have to create a file-backup of your wallet (it doesn't support mnemonic) the approach can be different.
Actually no, Bitcoin Core doesn't need to back up the wallet file repeatedly anymore, it doesn't generate "a bunch of keys" in batches. Bitcoin Core uses BIP32, and keys are generated from the BIP32 root key (the xpriv), so it creates deterministic wallets. I explain this further in my thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5498210.0



Quote from: hosemary on Today at 10:04:38 AM
As you know, Electrum doesn't allow users to generate a single private key, and whenever you want to generate a new wallet, it only allows them to generate a HD wallet.
That's not what I expressed interest in. I didn't ask Electrum to provide an option to create isolated keys, I’m referring to the existing key import feature, and whether the software would provide an "advanced wallet" option where the user can choose which account/keystore the change goes to, or if an imported key is added to the current HD keystore it was imported into, exactly like it worked prior to version 2.0 (that last scenario I mentioned).

Quote from: hosemary on Today at 10:04:38 AM
Therefore most of Electrum users (including almost all non-techincal users) have a HD wallet with seed phrase and since the "Use change address" option is enabled by default, they always use change addresses for their transactions.

The import private key feature in Electrum is mostly used by technical users and those who have very old wallets created before seed phrase were introduced.
The use change address option only works well for standard Electrum wallets or imported HD wallets, but not for imported keys and addresses. Test it yourself with testnet coins: import a few private keys into an "imported" wallet, check the "use change address" option, and you'll see what I mean. You'll find that with imported key keystores:

- use change address doesn't work as well as it does in HD wallets, there is no control.
- You have to keep importing new private keys so that new change outputs go to new imported keys, following the order in which they were imported (as they appear in the Addresses tab, respecting the queue).
- You cannot import public addresses into a keystore where you initially imported private keys and vice-versa during creation. Why? What is the logic behind that?

Run this test, and you should reach the same conclusion.

The Electrum developer himself has pointed out that Electrum's current architecture (especially for imported keystores) is "severely limited." He proposes creating an advanced wallet with features for advanced users, one that would allow importing xprivs/xpubs and even private keys/addresses (exactly how it currently works in Bitcoin Core). See here: https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/6016

Quote from: https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/6016
I think it would be really nice if there was an option to create an advanced wallet; a power user feature.
This wallet could not be restored from seed.

It would allow importing xprvs/xpubs: so the user could have multiple of these. Importing could even be allowed for existing wallets (not just in wizard at creation time). These could have differing script types associated with them.

I think even single privkeys/addresses could be allowed to be imported.

Perhaps the user could mark certain paths to be preferred to be given out as receive addresses, and others as preferred change.




50. Post 67080481 (unedited backup) (by joker_josue) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 19:23:20 CEST 2026) in Todas hardware wallets sofreram grandes problemas. Qual a solução?:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 03:00:07 PM
Como eu tenho as 3, uso todas pra dividir o que eu tenho, mas não é muito, mal dá para comprar uma bicicleta  Tongue

Ja pensou quanto teria de tivesse feito hold de tudo que ganhou aqui nos fóruns ate hoje?

Acho que essa é uma bao reflexão

Esse tipo de pergunta é tortura.

Mas, se realmente tivesse feito hold de 90%, do que conseguiu desde que entrei no Bitcoin... Enfim, é melhor nem pensar...



51. Post 67080130 (unedited backup) (by avp2306) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 17:35:49 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: examplens on Today at 08:50:08 AM
Would they have deep enough pockets for this? I can imagine they spent a lot of money on marketing, sales and the actual product, while they didn't sell that many devices. So if all buyers want their money back, they don't have that amount. If the victims want their losses compensated, they won't have that kind of money it either.

I wonder if they will be able to find the users who now hold those 1500 btc. One small mistake when spending, even in a kyc free exchange (like an ip leak),  might expose their identities

Tell will tell if someone from coldcard is involved
Well, there are indications that the hacker made a mistake and exposed information about himself. Activities were recognised where the operator used a paid account on a "well-known" blockchain service. A pattern of querying the original addresses was observed during the attack and this was repeated.

https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/08/19/block-and-galaxy-research-give-lead-to-law-enforcement-in-111m-coldcard-bitcoin-theft/

Now that they already traced the hacker, its good to see what other action they made. Because many people are so curious about this case, they want those people involve in this hacking issue to get captured.

Maybe this is also the reason why the funds stolen has left unmoved? https://crypto.news/coldcard-hackers-leave-87-of-stolen-bitcoin-unmoved-after-114m-theft they are maybe afraid to do transaction because it can create fresh traces to the authorities.

They should act fast, so they can still recover the funds and return it back to those proven victims.



52. Post 67079982 (unedited backup) (by ImGenius) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 16:42:56 CEST 2026) in [CHARTS] Brief monthly overview of Filipinas local boards activity:

Brief Overview of Pilipinas Local Board- JULY 2026
Date: From 01 July 2026 to 31 July 2026


Total active users in July Month (52):

Legendary Hero Member Sr. Member Full Member Member Jr. Member Newbie
PeanutswarblockmanAsuspawer09SatsPHfighter2627REDiceJerusalem12
arwin100bhadztech30338Bitcoinislife09Rmun1217
GreatArkansascoin-investorfullfitlarryEXMONsurbetes
cryptoaddictchiexLaysTypoTonicdemonica
lionheart78aioccoinrifftDEX.fo_off
julerz12qwertyup23AicecreaME
PX-Zbisdak40bettercrypto
FredomagorbynxxMr. Magkaisa
robelneoFinestream
SFR10Ziskinberg
abel1337Vaculin
CointxzQuestat
crwthBALIK
acroman08Oasisman
LogitechMousegunhell16
GazetaBitcoin
TryNinja
Xal0lex
BitMaxz
bitmover


June month overview
July month overview
Quote
NameValue
Posts552
Merits193
Merit Transactions163
Users Posted At Least Once56
Merits Per Post0.35
Merits Per Transaction1.18
Merited Posts81
Unmerited Posts471
Of Posts Merited15%
Quote
NameValueChanges
Posts586+34
Merits158-35
Merit Transactions149-14
Users Posted At Least Once55-1
Merits Per Post0.27-0.08
Merits Per Transaction1.06-0.12
Merited Posts88+7
Unmerited Posts498+27
Of Posts Merited15%0%
Top 10 Merit Senders (June)
Top 10 Merit Senders (July)
Quote
RankUsernameMerits
1cryptoaddictchie58
2julerz1217
3fullfitlarry14
4coinrifft12
5Husna QA10
6Peanutswar7
7fillippone7
8joker_josue6
9mindrust5
10DdmrDdmr4
Quote
RankUsernameMeritsChanges
1cryptoaddictchie50-8
2fighter262710New
3julerz129-8
4tech303387New
5Peanutswar6-1
6coinrifft5-7
7fullfitlarry5-9
8BitMaxz4New
9GreatArkansas4New
10LogitechMouse4New
Top 10 Merit Receivers (June)
Top 10 Merit Receivers (July)
Quote
RankUsernameMerits
1fullfitlarry29
2Peanutswar21
3coinrifft21
4GreatArkansas15
5fighter262715
6arwin10010
7cryptoaddictchie8
8Finestream7
9SatsPH7
10julerz127
Quote
RankUsernameMeritsChanges
1Peanutswar210
2SatsPH17+10
3GreatArkansas14-1
4fighter262713-2
5coinrifft11-10
6julerz1210+3
7cryptoaddictchie80
8arwin1007-3
9SFR106New
10tech303386New
Top 10 Active Users (June)
Top 10 Active Users (July)
Quote
RankUsernamePosts
1Peanutswar48
2Asuspawer0935
3tech3033830
4arwin10029
5blockman27
6GreatArkansas27
7cryptoaddictchie23
8Fredomago22
9bhadz22
10julerz1221
Quote
RankUsernamePostsChanges
1Peanutswar41-7
2Asuspawer0937+2
3tech3033837+7
4arwin10030+1
5blockman29+2
6GreatArkansas28+1
7bhadz23+1
8cryptoaddictchie230
9fighter262723New
10coin-investor220

Top 10 Most Active Topics (June)
Top 10 Most Active Topics (July)
Quote
Quote


Reference:

Inspired by:



53. Post 67079824 (unedited backup) (by Peanutswar) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 15:36:43 CEST 2026) in ♻️ DEX.fo 💚 | Bitcoin Price Prediction - Aug 29 | 🎁 Prize $50!:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 10:40:12 AM
➥ Post Bitcoin price prediction for Aug 29th (once submitted, you cannot edit your post).

Can I delete my previous post and post again? Looks "legal" according to the rules.

If tjhat is ok, here it goes. If not, please disconsider my post.
[...]
$79,258.00

Hello bitmover!

Thanks for being active in our events, apparently once you already made your entry this will considered as a count but our predictions are offered
Quote
Double/Triple prediction if you've already tested the swap and left a comment on kycnot/dex.fo or monerica/dex.fo.
so you can get a lot of chances to spot a good market trend and make your entry predictions  Wink



54. Post 67079184 (unedited backup) (by examplens) (scraped on Tue Aug 25 10:50:14 CEST 2026) in Large-scale coldcard compromise underway. 600 BTC drained so far :

Quote from: bitmover on August 24, 2026, 09:13:25 PM
I imagine there is likely more than one class action being cooked up.
Would they have deep enough pockets for this? I can imagine they spent a lot of money on marketing, sales and the actual product, while they didn't sell that many devices. So if all buyers want their money back, they don't have that amount. If the victims want their losses compensated, they won't have that kind of money it either.

I wonder if they will be able to find the users who now hold those 1500 btc. One small mistake when spending, even in a kyc free exchange (like an ip leak),  might expose their identities

Tell will tell if someone from coldcard is involved
Well, there are indications that the hacker made a mistake and exposed information about himself. Activities were recognised where the operator used a paid account on a "well-known" blockchain service. A pattern of querying the original addresses was observed during the attack and this was repeated.

https://www.cryptotimes.io/2026/08/19/block-and-galaxy-research-give-lead-to-law-enforcement-in-111m-coldcard-bitcoin-theft/



55. Post 67078228 (unedited backup) (by examplens) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 23:46:43 CEST 2026) in Looking for Reddit users:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 08:09:16 PM
The longest campaign i participate in reddit required posts in an specific subreddit
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=4236484.msg38445950#msg38445950
BITCORE BTX Reddit Campaign - Full Members+ - Earn $20/Week 

Their Reddit became quite active for some time, and we had no problems of accounts suspended.
This was a long time ago, and the rules on Reddit have changed significantly and become stricter. Many things that were allowed before are now not possible.

We will see how the manager and his client imagined this campaign. Such a campaign should certainly be kept behind closed doors



56. Post 67077552 (unedited backup) (by examplens) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 19:45:07 CEST 2026) in Looking for Reddit users:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 02:02:12 PM
One of my client needs a few Reddit users, Please let me know via PM if you are familiar with Reddit and regular there.

Cheers,

I have a 2600 karma account.  I might be able to help you but Reddit isnt very firendly to paid posts in big communities.
Reddit is quite restrictive, and every campaign must be very well organised. Maybe that's why it's one of the most popular forums/social networks.
And it's not just that "suspicious" posts will be deleted, but accounts can also be suspended very easily.



57. Post 67077320 (unedited backup) (by sabotag3x) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 18:29:55 CEST 2026) in Quem financia as eleições? Cripto, IA e Bet nos EUA. Mas, e no Brasil?:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 04:09:16 PM
As campanhas sao pagas exclusivamente com dinheiro  publico, e a sociedade é proibida de participar do financiamento de partidos ou políticos. Apenas pessoas fisicas podem doar e seguindo regras e limites

Outro dia vi uma galera batendo palma nas redes sociais para um candidato do PSOL que declarou uma bicicleta nos bens.. ai do lado tinha milhões de fundo de campanha Cheesy Cheesy Cheesy



58. Post 67076622 (unedited backup) (by rdluffy) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 14:36:31 CEST 2026) in Todas hardware wallets sofreram grandes problemas. Qual a solução?:

Quote from: bitmover on Today at 10:55:48 AM
Eu estou nessa situação e peguei uma nova, mas confesso que acho que não faz grande diferença em segurança.

acho que é mais pra interagir com Defi e outros protocolos smartcontracts que irá fazer diferença.

Eu criei uma nova carteira com uma passphrase forte mas ainda nao movi os fundos. Acho que isso faz difrença.

Aqui eu tenho uma Ledger Nano S + Trezor Safe 3 + Safepal X1

Tenho um pouco em cada carteira, sendo que na Trezor e Safepal criei carteiras adicionais com a passphrase

De resto tenho algumas carteiras com alguns poucos dólares espalhados para usar mais rapidamente como mandar dinheiro para casino, pagar algo, depositar no cartão etc

No momento não tenho mais o que fazer, mas se um dia eu viajar para fora de novo, vejo para comprar uma carteira nova e mais atual
Quem sabe ainda se tiver uma boa oferta na Black Friday dê para comprar uma trezor nova pela Amazon



59. Post 67076464 (unedited backup) (by icopress) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 13:47:37 CEST 2026) in Ⓜ️ MoBit.Exchange - Anonymous Exchange | Sig Campaign [OPEN]:

Thanks everyone for a great week / Payments for 3 week are on their way. [Exchange rate: 78,400] Wink

bitmover - Congratulations on your victory!



60. Post 67076021 (unedited backup) (by inspace) (scraped on Mon Aug 24 11:16:01 CEST 2026) in Ⓜ️ MoBit.Exchange 💠 FREE RAFFLE 💠 $30 in BTC:

💠 Target block - 963579 💠

 The winner of this round is bitmover. Congratulations! Wink



61. Post 67075031 (unedited backup) (by rdluffy) (scraped on Sun Aug 23 23:51:56 CEST 2026) in Qual plano de IA vocês mais usam? usam planos pagos?:

Quote from: bitmover on August 22, 2026, 08:38:12 PM
...


Eu peguei o de estudante ano passado.

O requisito é un email .Edu
Simplesmente peguei um gerador de email aleatórios e temporários .edu  , peguei o código que mandaram no email e pronto, virei estudante pro Google.

Legal, bom saber
Eu estava vendo uma pós graduação na i9, é super barata, e conseguiria além de uma carteirinha de estudante, o direito de ter essas promoções das IAs e ainda Youtube estudante
Se der certo eu compartilho aqui



Eu andei dando uma olhada em algumas soluções para me ajudar no dia a dia, mas é incrível a quantidade de novidades que tem
Fiquei bem perdido, parece que toda semana tem algo novo e todo mundo começa a recomendar, depois quando você pensa em usar já aparecem outras soluções, melhores e cheia de recursos haha

É a bolha das IAs



62. Post 67074678 (unedited backup) (by AB de Royse777) (scraped on Sun Aug 23 21:42:14 CEST 2026) in Priamex ♻️ FREE raffle #4 welcome round | Prize pool $30, Winner takes all!:

Quote from: AB de Royse777 on Today at 06:52:57 PM
Let's go with block height 963760
7 - DabsPoorVersion is our winner!



Verify
I will send the address to the management shortly. Once you receive the reward you can share your feedback.



63. Post 67074547 (unedited backup) (by AB de Royse777) (scraped on Sun Aug 23 20:58:07 CEST 2026) in Priamex ♻️ FREE raffle #5 welcome round | Prize pool $30, Winner takes all!:

Quote from: Navigation Menu
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